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I. INTRODUCTIONIN 1984 there were 8,183 new publicly offered issues of municipal se-
curities. 1 Their aggregate dollar volume substantially exceeded that of
all publicly issued corporate securities.' Unlike the corporate securities
market, however, public offerings of municipal securities are not subject
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933
Act"),3 nor are municipal issuers subject to reporting requirements under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").4 This Article argues
1. THE BOND BUYER'S MUNICIPAL STATBOOK 1984, at 7 [hereinafter MUNICIPAL STATBOOK].
The term "municipal securities" refers to the debt obligations of both states and local governments.
As of June 1, 1983, there were over 80,000 local governmental units, a term which is defined by the
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, to include municipalities, counties,
townships, school districts and special districts. In 1983, the outstanding municipal debt totaled
$454,501 billion, representing an estimated 52,000 issuers and one and one-half million separate
issues. A majority of the municipal borrowers were special districts and statutory public authorities
(classified as special districts by the Bureau of Census). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TRENDS AND CHANGES IN THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET AS THEY RELATE TO FINANCING
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE, S. Doc. No. GA 1.13 PAD 83-46, at 2, 14 (1983)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
2. New issue dollar volume of municipal securities for 1984 was $132,950 billion, as compared
with $95,986 billion in publicly offered corporate securities (equity and debt). THE BOND BUYER,
May 8, 1986, at 24; MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL FOR 1985, at
26.
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982) [hereinafter 1933 Act]. Section 3(a)(2) of the
1933 Act exempts from the registration and prospectus requirements of Section 5 securities issued by
"any State of the United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory or by any public
instrumentality of one or more States or territories .... "
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982) [hereinafter 1934 Act]. As "ex-
empted securities" under Section 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act, municipal securities are not subject to the
reporting requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of the 1934 Act. The antifraud provisions of Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act are, however, applicable to transactions in
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that it is time to re-evaluate the decision of fifty years ago not to impose
these registration and reporting requirements on municipal issuers.
The historical reasons for exempting state and local government is-
suers from the federal disclosure regulations stem, in part, from the per-
ceived nature of municipal securities as relatively risk free investments
that, because of the tax-exempt feature of the securities, appealed primar-
ily to investors capable of fending for themselves in the marketplace. To
the extent Congress considered the question of whether to make the 1933
Act applicable to offerings of municipal securities, there was a reluctance
to encroach upon an area as politically sensitive as state financing when
other factors indicated that there was not a pressing need for federal
intervention.'
Despite a tremendous increase in the amount of state and local bor-
rowing after World War II, accompanied by an increasing reliance on
revenue bond financing rather than general obligation bond financing,
6
municipal securities. Dealers and brokers in municipal securities are subject to regulation under
Section 15B of the 1934 Act, which was added in 1975 and created the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board to govern the activities of municipal securities dealers.
5. For a discussion of the legislative history of the exemptions for municipal securities from the
federal securities laws, see Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of
Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. R~v. 561, 582-86 (1975); see also Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. W. L. REV. 29, 46 (1959).
6. State debt in 1972 was 23.1 times that of 1946, while local debt increased almost nine-fold in
that period. W. SMrrI, THE APPRAISAL OF MUNICIPAL CREDIT RISK 172 (1979). The average
annual growth of municipal bond issues in the period 1946-65 was 12.4% as compared with an
average growth of less than 4% in gross national product and 5.3% average annual growth for
corporate bonds for the same period. STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
PROGRESS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., STATE AND LOCAL PuB-
LIC FACILrrY NEEDS AND FINANCING, vol. 2, 243 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter JEC REPORT].
For a discussion of the increase in state and local government expenditures in the period 1946-65, see
id. at 53-60. The compound annual rate of increase in outstanding debt of state and local govern-
ments for the period 1946-80 was 9.4%. L. MOAK, MUNICIPAL BONDS PLANNING, SALE AND AD-
MINISTRATION 4 (1982).
Revenue bond financing constituted 17.1% of the municipal issues in 1946, issued primarily to
finance municipal utility systems and (to a lesser extent) toll roads and bridges. JEC REPORT, supra,
at 157. Since 1977, revenue bonds have constituted over 50% of the long-term bond market. GAO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. In 1984, over 70% of the market was revenue bond financing. MUNiCI-
PAL STATBooK, supra note 1, at 7. The increase in the use of revenue bonds is related, in part, to the
greater reliance on special districts and authorities for the provision of government services. In many
cases, these units, particularly public authorities, do not have general taxing power and therefore
cannot issue general obligation bonds.
Increasing use of revenue bonds is also related to a shift in the use of bond proceeds from the
more traditional uses (for example, roads and utilities) to nontraditional uses: housing, hospitals,
industrial development, pollution control, and student loans (or what is sometimes referred to as "on
behalf of debt"). The ten year period from 1970-80 saw a 49% increase in "on behalf of" financing.
(This figure includes financing for municipally-owned electric and gas utilities but not other utilities.)
L. MOAK, supra, at 14. Most of this debt was revenue bond financing. In 1980 "on behalf of" debt
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the decision not to require disclosure of information by municipal issuers
went unquestioned until April, 1975, when New York City, with $600
million in short term notes due and no money in its coffers, could not
find a market for any more of its securities to raise the needed funds. 7 At
the time of New York City's financial collapse, it had over $14 billion of
debt outstanding, of which approximately one-half was short-term debt,
theoretically secured by either tax receipts or other city revenues.8 Exam-
ination after the fact revealed that New York City had come to the brink
of bankruptcy as a result, among other things, of extensive and long-
standing abuses in the city's financial practices that inflated reported rev-
enues to cover ever expanding budget deficits.9
As the story of New York City's fiscal plight unfolded, reforms were
called for. The market had clearly been unaware of the City's serious
financial position until it was too late. By all accounts of the fiscal crisis,
it appears that the major participants in the underwriting of the City's
securities-the City's underwriters and bond counsel-neither under-
stood the information given them nor sought explanations or further in-
formation. Two bills were introduced in Congress to require mandatory
disclosure by municipal issuers,10 but neither of these bills became law."1
(not including any municipally-owned utilities) formed 52% of the long-term bonds issued. W.
JACKSON, CAPITAL, CREDIT, AND CROWDING OUT: CYCLES AND TRENDS IN FLOWS OF FUNDS
OVER THREE DECADES, CRS-44 n.35 (Congressional Report Service Report No. 82-142E, August
1, 1982).
7. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST SESs., STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 245 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (transmitting
Securities and Exchange Commission Report). With the City's last offering in March, 1975, New
York had issued $4 billion in short-term debt in the previous six month period. The city needed an
estimated $2 billion in borrowings for the remainder of fiscal 1975 (ending June 30, 1975) to cover its
projected deficit, of which approximately $1.5 billion would be short-term. SEC REPORT, supra,
ch.1, at 235; C. MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS-NEw YORK CITY AND THE URBAN
EXPERIMENT, 1960-1975, at 228 (1980). For a detailed account of the events leading up to the
closing of the financial markets to the city's securities, see generally SEC REPORT, supra, at ch. 1.
8. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, Introduction and Summary, at 2. Over $1 billion in short-term
debt was issued against anticipated property tax revenues and over $3 billion was issued against
other city revenues, including other taxes and federal monies. Id. The City's short-term obligations
made up over 40% of the municipal note market. C. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 223.
9. It has been estimated that the property tax receivables were overstated by approximately
$408 million. Similar gaps in other anticipated revenues existed. The New York State Comptroller
found, for example, that intergovernmental aid had been overstated by $324.6 million. SEC REPORT,
supra note 7, Introduction and Summary, at 4. An internal memorandum from the City Comptrol-
ler's office in October, 1974, suggested that $2.7 billion of New York City receivables would be
required to be written off under generally accepted accounting principles. C. MORRIS, supra note 7,
at 223.
10. A Senate bill introduced by Senator Eagleton would have removed the exemption in Section
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Congress' decision not to place any disclosure requirements on municipal
issuers must be viewed in light of the National League of Cities v. Usery 12
decision in 1976, which resuscitated the tenth amendment as an in-
dependent check on the exercise of the commerce power by Congress.
While the National League of Cities case raised more questions than it
answered, it was clear that any federal legislation in the area of disclosure
would be challenged as a violation of the tenth amendment. Against the
uncertainty as to how far Congress could legislate, there was evidence
that underwriters, after the New York City crisis, were, in fact, forcing
more "voluntary" disclosure by municipal issuers.13
Eight years after New York City's crisis, in July, 1983, the Washing-
ton Public Power Supply System ("WPPSS"), composed of a group of
publicly owned utility districts and cities in Washington State,14 de-
faulted on $2.25 billion in revenue bonds issued to finance the construc-
tion of two nuclear power plants ("Plants 4 and 5"). Construction of
Plants 4 and 5 had been cancelled the previous January when it became
clear that the necessary additional funding could not be raised to finance
their completion. This constituted the largest default of publicly issued
securities in capital markets history, and again an unregulated municipal
entity was the issuer.15 Although what happened at WPPSS is still under
3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act for municipal securities, thus subjecting municipal issues to the registration
requirements of Section 5, unless otherwise exempted under another provision of the Act. S. 2574,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1976). A more limited approach was taken in a bill sponsored by Senators
Williams and Tower, which provided for disclosure statements for new issues over $5 million and
annual reports by issuers with over $50 million in outstanding debt. S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
11. Certain reforms of the municipal securities market, however, were enacted in the 1975
Amendments to the 1934 Act. These reforms made explicit the application of the antifraud provi-
sions of Rule 10b(5) to municipal issuers and created, for the first time, a mechanism for the regula-
tion of the activities of municipal securities dealers similar to the regulation of brokers and dealers of
corporate securities. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)-(c) (1982)).
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
13. See, eg., Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (testimony of Professor Ronald
Forbes at Senate Hearings on S. 2574 and S. 2969); see also Petersen, Doty, Forbes & Bourque,
Searching for Standards: Disclosure in the Municipal Securities Market?, 1976 DUKE L. J. 1177,
1187-97; infra, Section V.
14. WPPSS is a municipal corporation and joint operating agency of the State of Washington
created in 1957 to facilitate the provision of electric power and energy. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.52 (1983) (detailing the formation and administration of such operating agencies). In addition
to Plants 4 and 5, WPPSS owns three companion nuclear power plants, of which only Plant 2 is in
operation; it also owns and operates two other electric generating plants. WASHINGTON PUB.
POWER SUPPLY SYS., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 26-27 (Mar. 17, 1981).
15. Penn Central defaulted on $618.18 million in debt, constituting the largest corporate debt
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investigation, and the numerous securities fraud suits by WPPSS bond-
holders are still in the discovery stages, the occurrence of such a large
default not many years after New York City's near default suggests that
the decision, made at the time the securities laws were passed, not to
require disclosure of information by municipal issuers demands yet an-
other look. Such a re-evaluation is particularly timely, because the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court, in 1985, to overrule National League of
Cities, means that the tenth amendment no longer casts as much of a pall
over any efforts at reform.' 6
Section II of the Article reviews the role of information in security
pricing and the social importance of accurate pricing of municipal securi-
ties. This review makes clear that a re-evaluation should not, however, be
discussed solely in terms of the traditional rationale for the federal secur-
ities laws-investor protection-but should have a broader focus: the
role the municipal securities market plays in how society decides the
amount and mix of public sector expenditures.17 Section III considers the
reasons historically given for exempting municipal securities and finds
them unpersuasive in light of the nature of today's market for municipal
securities and the social role that it plays. Section IV explores an alterna-
tive argument for exempting municipal securities based on the skepticism
of many modern finance theorists as to the need and cost effectiveness of
traditional corporate disclosure regulations. This skepticism suggests, at
least at first blush, that an extension of the corporate disclosure require-
ments to cover municipal issuers as well is a move in the wrong direction.
It is based on a growing body of literature that posits that market incen-
tives alone are sufficient to force issuers to produce and disseminate all
the information investors actually want."8 This argument is then consid-
ered in the context of the municipal securities market, applying public
default. MORGAN STANLEY, THE DEFAULT RATE EXPERIENCE ON HIGH YIELD CORPORATE
DEBT 27 app. (Mar. 1985).
16. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
17. A re-evaluation of the decision to include municipal securities within the registration ex-
emption of Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act involves many considerations. For example, an initial
matter to be addressed is whether mandated disclosure for offerings of municipal securities should
only be required at the time of original issuance or, given the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") commitment to integrated disclosure, which seeks to combine the disclosure obligations of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, whether municipal issuers should be required to disclose material informa-
tion on a continuing basis. Any such re-evaluation must confront the issues of the relationship be-
tween the benefits of any proposed federally mandated disclosure regulations and the cost to
municipalities, elected officials and other persons who would be involved in the preparation and
dissemination of the disclosure material. It must also include a judgment of the relative effectiveness
of current state and federal regulation of municipal securities, issuers and dealers.
18. See infra Section IV(A).
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choice theory and organization theory to the behavior of politicians and
government bureaucrats, in order to determine whether we can expect
similar responses from municipal issuers to market incentives for disclo-
sure. Political and bureaucratic factors create at least as great incentives
for governmental officials to withhold information as exist in the private
sector. But, neither the market incentives nor the monitoring devices that
are said to promote voluntary disclosure in connection with the corpo-
rate securities market operate for municipal securities. Section V of the
Article examines some of the empirical evidence as to current disclosure
practices of municipal issuers. This evidence generally indicates a less
than optimal amount of disclosure in the municipal securities market.
Problems of non-disclosure of relevant information and the lack of uni-
formity as to what is disclosed continue to plague the market. These
problems cannot be resolved without mandatory rules of disclosure.
II. ROLE OF INFORMATION
In the case of private firms, the allocation of investors' savings is
accomplished through market pricing of their securities. The accuracy of
the prices is a function of how much information is possessed by the
market participants. The accuracy of the pricing mechanism of the capi-
tal market is important because it assures the flow of savings, a scarce
resource, to its most productive uses.19 In a fully informed market, those
firms whose projects are the most promising will attract investors' funds
at acceptable costs, while firms with less promising projects will choose
not to proceed due to the increased cost of attracting capital. If securities
prices are inaccurate because of a lack of information or because of erro-
neous information, there will be a misallocation of capital. Some of the
most promising projects could go unfunded, while others with less prom-
ising prospects of success would be funded.2"
Is the accuracy of the pricing mechanism for municipal securities as
important? It will be seen that accurate pricing of municipal securities
serves two important societal functions. First, comparable to prices of
corporate securities, they serve as a guide to the efficient allocation of
savings to, and within, the public sector. Second, accurate pricing serves
to signal when adjustments need to be made in the level of public expend-
19. Mendelson, Economics and the Assessment of Disclosure Requirements, J. COMP. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG., 49, 50-51 (1978).
20. Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10(b)(5), 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307,
1316-18 (1981).
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itures when such level is not supportable in the long-run at politically
acceptable rates of taxation, given the existing tax base.
A. Efficient Allocation of Savings
To understand the allocation function of pricing in the municipal
securities market, we must first distinguish between the two types of mu-
nicipal securities: revenue bonds, or non-guaranteed debt, which is se-
cured solely by the revenues generated by the particular project to which
such bonds relate, and general obligation bonds, or guaranteed debt,
which is backed by the general tax revenues of the issuing entity.
1. Revenue Bonds. Revenue bonds, which constitute almost three-
quarters of the municipal market,2 are used by state and local govern-
ments for the construction of facilities that, theoretically, through the
imposition of fees or charges, will generate sufficient revenues to amor-
tize the debt over the useful life of the facility. Thus, revenue bond fi-
nancing has been traditionally associated with the construction of toll
roads, bridges, and community water, sewer, and power systems. More
recently, revenue bond financing has become associated with industrial
development projects that are, in fact, projects of private industry utiliz-
ing the tax advantages of municipal issuers.22
The revenue bond portion of the municipal securities market is
analogous to the corporate securities market in that the investor's invest-
ment decisions are similarly concerned with the determination of the rel-
ative productive uses of capital. Accurate pricing of revenue bonds
enables investors to evaluate competing investment opportunities and
channel savings to projects that show the most promise of success.2 3
Clearly, this is the case with industrial development and pollution con-
trol bonds, which in 1984 constituted approximately 15% of the publicly
offered municipal securities market.24 With respect to the more tradi-
21. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
22. Id. at 15, 50.
23. In 1984, there were 3,652 publicly offered revenue bond issues among which investors could
choose to invest their savings. Municipal bond information provided by the Public Securities Associ-
ation's Colorado-based Lockheed data base (1984) (on file at the BUFFALO LAW REVIEW).
24. MUNICIPAL STATBOOK, supra note 1, at 7. Accurate pricing of industrial development and
pollution control bonds will not, however, correct the inequities created by the federal tax subsidies
in favor of industries that obtain revenue bond financing.
The Bond Buyer's 1984 figures for pollution control bonds and industrial revenue bonds are $14.6
billion and $4.5 billion, respectively. These figures do not include the sizeable market of "small
issue' industrial revenue bonds that, because of the $10 million limit in the size of certain types of
industrial revenue bond issues, I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D) (1986), are more often privately placed with
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tional revenue bond financed projects, absent government subsidies, ac-
curate pricing would again result in the allocation of capital to the most
promising projects. Very few government owned-and-operated projects
are, however, without some form of government subsidy, whether in the
form of direct appropriations or tax benefits. The existence of these subsi-
dies may weaken the precision with which the market channels funds to
such projects because they reduce the risks of default associated with less
promising projects. The market is, nevertheless, a powerful force in that
a project judged to be unpromising, absent subsidies, requires the com-
mitment of more subsidies if the securities are to be sold at an acceptable
cost.
2. General Obligation Bonds. Long-term general obligation bond
financing, once the mainstay of municipal financing, is used for funding
those public facilities that either do not produce revenues (for example,
town halls, police stations etc.), or for which it is considered, as a matter
of public policy, inappropriate to levy fees for public use (for example,
public schools or parks). Short-term general obligation note financing is
used to bridge cash flow gaps between expenditures and the receipt of
revenues or proceeds from long-term bond issues.25
Financing to support the provision of public services cannot be ana-
lyzed in terms of the allocation of investment resources to the most pro-
ductive uses. Municipal borrowing of this kind is the community
equivalent of an individual borrowing to finance the purchase of a con-
sumer durable, such as a car. One community's choice of government
financial institutions. The industrial revenue bond market (including small industrial revenue bond
issues) was estimated to be $12.7 billion for 1982. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 app. VI.
Because there have been no reporting requirements for municipal issuers, there has not developed
a single repository for statistical information concerning state and local debt. Data compiled by The
Bond Buyer, the Public Securities Association, and the Bureau of the Census are generally relied on
by observers of the market. All three focus on publicly offered debt. The Bond Buyer and the Public
Securities Association use the calendar year and their figures, while rarely in total agreement, are
substantially the same. (For example, the total amount of long-term bonds issued in 1984 was $101.9
billion according to The Bond Buyer and $104.9 billion according to the Public Securities Associa-
tion. Pub. Sec. A., Municipal Market Developments: Use of Proceeds Report from 1/1/84 through
12/31/84 (Feb. 26, 1985)). The Bureau of the Census uses the fiscal year as its basis for compiling
data, and its figures therefore do not tally with the others. L. MOAK, supra note 6, at 12-13. As a
result of revisions to Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code in 1982, issuers are now required to
supply details of "private purpose" bond issues to the Treasury Department, defined to include:
industrial development bonds, student loan bonds and private exempt entity bonds (loans to Section
501(c) organizations). I.R.C. § 1030) (1986), P.L. 97-248, § 215(b)(1).
25. For discussion of the uses and advantages of the different forms of municipal securities, see
R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS 9-17 (1980); L. MOAK, supra note 6, at 112-18; JEC
REPORT, supra note 6, at 148-61.
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services cannot readily be compared with another's. Although it may not
be possible to determine if community A's use for capital is more or less
productive than community B's, it is possible, through accurate pricing,
to insure that the community that places more value on borrowing, that
is, on proceeding now with a program of public services to be paid for
later, has access to capital. If prices are inaccurate, so that community A,
with a higher chance of default (including the possibility of failure to
repay on schedule) than community B, is able to borrow at terms equal
to or better than community B, the expected return to an investor in
community A's securities, and hence the expected cost of borrowing to
community A, will be lower than the expected cost of borrowing to com-
munity B. In such a case, community A might choose to borrow and
community B might choose not to, even if community B places more
value in borrowing. Where prices are accurate, so that the expected costs
are the same for each, the prices, in a sense, test the strength of a commu-
nity's commitment to its goals. With equal expected costs, the more uni-
fied public officials perceive the citizens of a community to be with regard
to a particular allocation of resources for public services, the more likely
they will be willing to pay the cost of borrowing.26
B. Adjustment Mechanism
Accurate pricing also facilitates needed adjustments in the level of
public expenditures in that current services are not sustainable in the
long run at politically acceptable rates, given the community tax base.
The need for adjustments can arise either because of an adverse change in
the tax base or other revenue source, or because of overly ambitious pub-
lic sector programs. As developed in Section IV of this Article, there is a
strong potential for public officials to engage in fiscal mismanagement.
A well functioning market for municipal securities is likely to produce
signals of such mismanagement long before it would otherwise be appar-
ent to the public, since much of the budget information is under the con-
trol of the government bureaucracy and not easily available to elected
officials and legislators. In addition, that which is available will often not
be passed on to the citizens.27
26. The degree of commitment within the community will be reflected in its willingness, as a
political matter, to be taxed. For example, one study of the municipal securities market in the late
1950s found that communities with a strong public demand for particular projects went ahead with
financing, despite a market that might have been "temporarily weak." R. ROBINSON, POSTWAR
MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 46 (1960).
27. For a discussion of the capacity and willingness of these groups to monitor the activities of
the bureaucracy, see infra Section IV(B)(2).
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To illustrate this point, consider the New York City fiscal crisis. The
growth of government services during the period 1965 to 1975, particu-
larly in the areas of health, higher education and welfare services, and
the higher than average labor union settlements were frequently cited as
major contributing factors in trying to determine the how and why of
New York City's financial collapse."8 The market cannot determine
whether New York City should operate municipal hospitals, provide free
tuition, operate open admission colleges, or pay its employees higher
wages in the form of pension benefits. Those are political determinations.
But, if the market had had access to the relevant information as to the
City's declining employment and eroding tax base, its uncollected tax
revenues and unfunded pension obligations, the market, through its
prices, could have signaled earlier than it did that revenues at politically
acceptable rates of taxation were not likely to be sufficient to continue to
support the level of services New York was providing.
More accurate pricing of New York City's securities at an earlier
date would not have been a panacea for the City's problems, many of
which were either beyond its control or so intractable as to be beyond its
control. But, by facilitating the recognition of new economic realities, it
would have made these realities less wrenching for citizens and investors
alike.
III. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALES
AGAINST MANDATORY DISCLOSURE FOR
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Accurate pricing serves societal functions in the municipal securities
market at least as important as it does in the corporate securities market.
Since accurate pricing depends on accurate information, what are the
mechanisms for the production and dissemination of information in the
municipal market and how do they relate to the legal alternatives avail-
able to us? The discussion which follows reviews the traditional justifica-
28. For discussions of the City's spending patterns in the decade preceding the fiscal crisis, see
P. MCCLELLAND & A. MAGDOVrIZ, CRISIS IN THE MAKING 310-20 (1981); C. MORRIS, supra note
7, at 172-94; CONG. BUDGET OFF., 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., NEW YORK CITY'S FISCAL PROBLEM:
ITS ORIGINS, POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS, AND SOME ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES (1975),
reprinted in 90 POL. SCL Q. 659, 669-72 (1976) [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFF.]; Gramlich, The
New York City Fiscal Crisis: What Happened and What is to be Done?, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 417-
21 (1976). Gramlich's study found that much of the City's deficit was composed of expenditures for
welfare, higher education, public hospitals, public housing, transit, and pension contributions, and
that these individual component deficits were much greater than those incurred by other cities. Id. at
421.
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tions made for not establishing a system of mandatory disclosure by
municipal issuers and finds them to be of questionable validity under
modem conditions.
Two factors are generally cited as justifying the continued exemp-
tion of municipal securities from the registration and reporting require-
ments of the securities laws: the low credit risk associated with municipal
securities, and the financial sophistication of the investors. Credit risk is a
measure of the chances of default in the timely payment of principal and
interest. It is asserted that, since the default rate of municipal securities
historically has been low compared with corporate securities, these secur-
ities pose little financial risk to the investor. Moreover, because investors
in municipal securities are overwhelmingly financial institutions and
wealthy individuals, they are in a position to understand, evaluate and
bear those credit and market risks which are involved in purchases of
municipal securities.29
A. Low Credit Risk
1. Default Rate. Since the Depression, municipal bonds, in partic-
ular general obligation bonds, have had a very favorable credit record,
both in terms of a low default rate and in terms of the ultimate payment
of those obligations on which there are defaults.3 0 The low default rate
for general obligation bonds stems from the existence of a stream of tax
revenues independent, at least in the short-term, of the value of the goods
and services produced by the issuer. Tax revenues for most local govern-
ments are derived primarily from property taxes, a revenue source less
29. For an articulation of these arguments in opposition to the proposed federal regulation of
the municipal securities market, see, e.g., 1976 Hearings, supra note 13, at 155-66 (testimony of Hon.
Richard Carver, Mayor of Peoria, Illinois, on behalf of the National League of Cities and the U.S.
Conference of Mayors). A number of law review articles and notes appeared following the New
York City crisis that examined the traditional rationales for the exemption from the federal securi-
ties laws. See, eg., Doty & Petersen,The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal
Securities, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 283, 325-29, 341-42 (1976); Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal
Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L. REV. 1261, 1267-70; Note, Fed-
eral Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. REv. 567, 579-86 (1976); Note, Muncipal
Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND.
L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1975).
30. There were 431 recorded defaults for state and local governments in the period 1945-69,
most of which were "technical and temporary," with a total dollar volume of $450 million. J. PE-
TERSEN, THE RATING GAME 110 (1974). Permanent losses on principal and interest in the twenty
year period 1945-65 were less than .01% of the debt outstanding at the end of 1965. Id. at 111 (citing
G. HEMPEL, POSTWAR QUALITY 19-21 (1971)). For statistics comparing the default rate of
muncipal bonds with that of corporate bonds, both during the Depression and in the post-Depres-
sion era, see Seligman, Municipal Disclosure, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 647, 651-52 n.17 (1984).
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buffeted by cyclical downturns in the general economy31 and hence more
stable than the sales of most corporate enterprises. Having revenue
sources separate from the value of their outputs also means that if bank-
ruptcy threatens, governments can fall back on their tax revenues, giving
them a longer lead time than corporate borrowers to put their financial
houses in order. Even in the absence of threatened bankruptcy, their fi-
nancial health is enhanced by having a greater ability to avoid borrowing
during periods of high interest.32 These factors also help explain why
there is a substantial likelihood that payment will be ultimately made on
those obligations that do default.33
Notwithstanding these factors and the overall low default rate for
general obligation bonds, recent history suggests that defaults on such
bonds are still sufficiently important to raise questions about the need for
mandatory disclosure. The amounts involved in the defaults of New
York City and WPPSS each exceeded the largest corporate default in
history, that of Penn Central in 1970, and each affected large numbers of
bondholders.34 New York City involved general obligation short-term
31. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 28, at 666; Ladd, The Role of the Property Tax."A Reassess-
ment, in BROAD BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 39, 77-78 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973).
32. There are, of course, costs involved in withdrawing from the market, namely, forbearance of
needed capital improvements. High interest rates have played a "significant role" in the decline in
expenditures on public infrastructure. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
Various studies have found that interest cost fluctuations affect the timing of bond issues by state
and local governments. Smaller governmental units faced with tight credit either perservered with
their financing or cancelled the projects. Larger units used short-term debt or "ran down financial
assets" during periods of high interest rates. JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, 30
(Comm. Print 1976). Another study analyzed reported delays or postponements of bond issues in the
period 1974-82, as conipared with total actual funding, and found that the rise and fall in delays and
cancellations roughly paralleled the rise and fall of interest rates. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
It further found that fluctuations appeared to be more important than actual interest rate level,
which finding supports the earlier study done for the Joint Economic Committee in 1966. Compare
id. at 28 with JEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 318. The author of the earlier study suggested that
concern as to fluctuation may be related to concern about the arbitrage rules. JEC REPORT, supra
note 6, at 315. Arbitrage is the gain that the issuer obtains from the reinvestment of the proceeds of a
municipal bond issue in higher yielding taxable obligations. The Internal Revenue Code limits the
circumstances in which municipal issuers can arbitrage bond proceeds. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2) (1986).
33. Of the $1.35 billion in municipal bonds in default in 1932, permanent losses were about $200
million. W. SMITH, THE APPRAISAL OF MUNICIPAL CREDIT RISK, 244 (1979). The repayment rec-
ord of municipal issuers on defaulted obligations suggests that investors who were not forced to sell
at distressed prices lost little in the way of principal repayment. Id.
34. See supra note 15. It has been estimated that at the time of New York City's "near" default,
there were 160,000 individual holders of the City's long-term bonds. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch.
7, at 1. As to its short-term obligations, no specific figures can be found. It is known, however, that
the City's short-term notes, aggregating $4.5 billion, constituted over 40% of the nation's short-term
market. C. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 223. During the months of October and November, 1974, the
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notes.35 WPPSS involved a hybrid form of revenue bond designed to be
marketed as providing the security of a general obligation bond.36
Although New York City avoided bankruptcy, and through a financial
restructuring ultimately met its obligations, the holders of the City's se-
curities suffered significant market losses.3" For holders of WPPSS Plants
City issued $2.5 billion in notes. Due to market saturation, in November, 1974, the City reduced the
face amount of a portion of its notes from $25,000 to $10,000 in order to attract individual investors.
SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 3, 27.
The WPPSS bonds for Plants 4 and 5 are held by an estimated 75,000 investors. Gleckman,
WPPSS From Dream to Default, CREDTrr MARKETS, Jan. 3, 1984, at 1, 39. At hearings before the
Subcommittee on Mining, Forest Management and the Bonneville Power Administration of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, a representative of Lazard, Freres and Co., the invest-
ment banking firm that was, at the time, WPPSS's financial advisor, testified that it was his "impres-
sion" that "the market for the 4 or 5 bonds from the beginning of sales of those bonds always was
much more to retail or individual market than the net billed bonds [those relating to Plants 1, 2 and
3]." Bonneville Power Administration: Financial Fallout From Termination of WPPSS Nuclear
Projects 4 and 5. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mining, Forest Mgmt., and Bonneville Power
Administration of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1983)
[hereinafter Bonneville Hearings] (statement of John S. Tamagni). The representative, who was the
partner in charge of Lazard's municipal bond department, estimated the percentage of Plants 4 and 5
bonds held by institutions to be "very low." Id. One estimate puts individual holdings at 70% of the
Plants 4 and 5 bonds. Bernstein, A Nuclear Fiasco Shakes The Bond Market, FORTUNE, Feb. 22,
1982, at 112.
35. The City's short-term debt included approximately $1 million in tax anticipation notes
("TANS"), $3.2 million in revenue anticipation notes ("RANS"), $1.8 million in bond anticipation
notes ("BANS"), and $108,000 in other short-term debt. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, Introduction
and Summary, at 2. The TANS, RANS and BANS were marketed as having a "first lien" on the
City's revenues. This first lien for TANS and RANS, however, was, in fact, the right to have pay-
ments set aside if such notes were not paid within five years of the date of issuance; there was no first
lien of any kind for BANS. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. Despite apparent agreement among City
officials and its bond counsel that there was no such first lien, the City's notices of sale for its short.
term notes continued to refer to the existence of a first lien on City revenues. SEC REPORT, supra
note 7, ch. 3, at 66-71.
36. Debt service on the WPPSS Plants 4 and 5 bonds was obstensibly to come from the revenues
generated from the sale of electricity produced by the nuclear power plants to the 88 utilities partici-
pating in the projects. Bondholders were protected against the risk of insufficient revenues by "take-
or-pay" contracts executed by the participating utilities, whereby the utilities agreed to pay their
respective portions of total costs whether or not the projects were completed or operating. The
economic thrust of the take-or-pay financing was to put the utilities in the position of guaranteeing
the payments of principal and interest on the bonds. As municipally-owned utilities, they could raise
their rates as needed without prior state regulatory approval. See, WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER
SUPPLY SYSTEM, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, Mar. 17, 1981, at cover page (providing factual details of
bond terms). Plants 1, 2, and 3 were also financed with revenue bonds, but those bonds were backed
by a financing device known as a net billing arrangement with the Bonneville Power Administration
("BPA"), a federal agency, whereby BPA assumes the participants' obligations to pay their share of
the costs of construction.
37. The $1.6 billion of New York City short-term notes that were subject to the N.Y. State
Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, 1975 N.Y. Laws 874-75 [hereinafter Morato-
rium Act], enacted by the New York State legislature to extend the notes' maturity and reduce
interest payments to 6%, lost approximately 40% of their par value. Notes exchanged for the 10-
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4 and 5 bonds, the loss in value was total. The participating members of
WPPSS who had backed the bonds for the defunct projects with guaran-
tees of payment under take-or-pay contracts have been relieved by the
courts of their obligations.38 The underlying projects remain uncom-
pleted and, as such, will never produce revenue. In each case, the effects
of the defaults were felt by other issuers in the market in the form of
higher borrowing costs.39
Most of the other municipal defaults that have occurred in the post-
World War II period have been with respect to revenue bonds.' The
greater risk of default, should project revenues be insufficient, is reflected
in the interest rate differential between revenue bonds and general obliga-
tion bonds. 41 On average, revenue bonds carry an interest rate approxi-
mately one-half of one percent higher than general obligation bonds.42
year bonds of the Municipal Assistance Corporation at 8% interest, sold at 70% of par value. Doty
& Petersen, supra note 29, at 332-33 nn.194-95. Discounts in the 35-45% range were also found after
default. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, Introduction and Summary, at 1. The Moratorium Act was held
unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp. of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848 (1976).
38. In June, 1983, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the participation agreements
entered into by the State's municipalities and public utility districts, covering 70% of the construc-
tion costs, were ultra vires and unenforceable. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply
Sys., 99 Wash.2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
39. Studies conducted after the New York City fiscal crisis showed that the City's default in-
creased borrowing costs for other northern industrial cities in the immediate period following de-
fault. Cook, Determinants of Individual Tax-Exempt Yields: A Survey of the Evidence, 68 EcON.
REv. 14, 26-27 (May/June 1982). Since the WPPSS default, Washington State has paid a premium
on its bond issues of 30-50 basis points. THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 16, 1983; THE BOND BUYER, Apr.
4, 1984, at 1-2; THE BOND BUYER, May 23, 1986, at 1. In November, 1983, the bonds of a major
participating utility in WPPSS were priced to yield over one percentage point higher than bonds of
comparable issuers. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1983, at D9, col. 1.
The effect of the WPPSS default has been felt by issuers outside Washington State as well. Once
alerted to the problems in the public power industry, the market priced the bonds of the first power
authority to issue bonds after the WPPSS default, Michigan Public Power Agency, to yield three-
quarters of a percentage point more than comparable issuers. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at D7, col. 1.
A recent report prepared by the Bond Investors Association and Professor Robert Lamb of New
York University Graduate School of Business Administration, estimates that the WPPSS default
resulted in $700 million in additional interest costs in 1985 for municipal borrowers. THE BOND
BUYER, May 30, 1986, at 4.
40. Of the $450 million of defaulted bonds in the period 1945-1969, $334 million represented the
defaults of two major revenue bond issues. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 110-11. Similarly, most of
the remaining defaulted issues related to revenue bond financings. Id. at 112; JEC REPORT, supra
note 6, at 245-46.
41. It has also been suggested that the rate differential is attributable to the poorer marketability
of revenue bonds and the inability of commercial banks to underwrite them. Cook, supra note 39, at
35.
42. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; Kidwell & Koch, The Behavior of the Interest Rate
Differential Between Tax-exempt Revenue and General Obligation Bonds: A Test of Risk Preferences
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This difference in default risk is important to the question at hand be-
cause, since the passage of the federal securities laws, revenue bond fi-
nancing has eclipsed general obligation bonds as the major portion of the
market. And while the federal tax exemption for industrial development,
pollution control, and mortgage revenue bonds has been curtailed under
the recent revisions of the tax laws,43 other forms of revenue bond financ-
ing should increase as local governments, legally or politically restrained
in their ability to raise property taxes, turn more to user fees as a means
of financing public services. 44
2. Indirect Measures of Risk: Yield Structure and Insurance. Even
without the two sizeable exceptions of New York City and WPPSS, and
the basic distinction between general obligation and revenue bonds, the
bond yield structure for municipal securities tells us that not all
municipals are created equal and that information concerning issues is
important to the market despite the low overall risk of default. Issues of
comparable size, maturity, and interest often sell at different prices. This
and Market Segmentation, 37 J. FIN. 73 (1982). The study conducted by Kidwell and Koch of the
yield differential between the two types of securities found that the differential varied countercycli-
cally with the level of economic activity; increases in commercial bank demand for tax-exempt secur-
ities and increases in the supply of revenue bonds relative to general obligation bonds increased the
yield differentials. Id. at 77-80, 84. For a discussion of commercial bank investment in municipal
securities, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. See also Heins, The Interest Rate Differentlal
Between Revenue Bonds and General Obligation Bonds: A Regression Model, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 399,
399-405 (1962).
43. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514, the amount and types of some forms of
"private purpose" bonds are restricted and others are eliminated. For example, pollution control
bonds are now taxable. Small issue industrial development bonds will lose their exemption over the
next three years. Id. at § 1301.
44. The use of user fees increased 135% in the period 1972-80 as compared to a 104% increase
in taxes. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. In absolute dollars, the years 1978-79 and 1979-80 show
14% and 15% increases, respectively, in user fee revenues as compared with 1% and 4.8% for
property tax revenues. Petersen, Federal Fiscal Policy and Aid to State and Local Governments: n
Age ofAusterity, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 383, 384 (1981). The increase is attributed in part to the property
tax revolts during this period, which led to the adoption of more stringent property tax limitations
such as Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 21/2 in Massachusetts. The need for voter ap-
proval for general obligation bond issues also will continue to influence the decisions of issuers to use
revenue bonds, which generally do not require voter approval. While we may have passed the peak
of voter resistence, in the period 1971-78, only 53% of proposed bond sales were approved by voters
as compared with 80% in the 1950s. Forbes, Fischer & Petersen, Recent Trends in Municipal Bond
Financing, in EFFICIENCY IN THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET: THE USE OF TAX ExEMPT FINANC-
ING FOR "PRIVATE" PURPOSES 149, 159-60 (G. Kaufman ed. 1981). A recent example of states
turning to revenue bond financing where voter approval of general obligation bonds has not been
forthcoming is the use of leasing schemes for prison construction. In 1983, only 40% of prison bond
proposals before the voters passed as opposed to an overall rate of 72% for bond proposals. THE
BOND BUYER, Aug. 26, 1986, at 4, 21.
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suggests that the market determines each bond's yield to maturity based
on an individual assessment of the credit and market risks of such bond.
The municipal securities market is characterized by an extremely
large number of issuers and issues45 and by a variety of forms of debt
obligations, designed to comply with, or avoid, particular state laws with
respect to the issuance of debt.46 Given the array of issuers and issues
and the lack of any uniform reporting requirements, market participants
rely on the two national rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and
Standard & Poor's Corporation, to evaluate the credit risk of new issues
of securities. Between the two agencies, 60% of new issues are rated and
90% of the total dollar volume of new issues is rated. 7 The importance
of the rating process in the pricing of municipal securities is reflected in
the cost of borrowing. The higher the rating, the lower the yield de-
manded by investors.4 8 The differential between an Aaa/AAA rated
bond (highest investment grade) and a Baa/BBB bond (the lowest invest-
ment grade) averages 75 basis points.49 Studies also show that higher
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. At the time of the GAO Report, there were an estimated
1 /2 million outstanding municipal issues as compared with 6,000 outstanding corporate stock and
bond issues. Id.
46. For a description of the various, and often confusing, classification schemes that have been
developed to deal with the number of different types of issuers and debt instruments in the municipal
securities market, see L. MoAK, supra note 6, at 37-43. Revenue bonds, in particular, come in many
forms depending on the source of the pledged revenues. For example, the Public Securities Associa-
tion classifies revenue bonds into six subclasses, while Moody's Investors Service uses three catego-
ries for revenue bonds, which are then further broken down into 14 different subclasses. See infra
text accompanying note 47.
The existence of state constitutional limitations on the amount of debt states and local govern-
ments can issue, and the judicial interpretation of such limitations as only applying to full faith and
credit obligations (that is, general obligation bonds), have been a significant impetus in the creation
of different forms of "non-guaranteed" debt, including moral obligation bonds, special fund bonds
and lease obligation bonds, all of which have been held, with few exceptions, not to count against the
issuer's debt limitations because they are not backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer. A.
WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BusINsSS 21-22 (1978). See generally Bowmar, The Anachronism Called
Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. REv. 863 (1967) (discussing devices that have been created to avoid
debt limit restrictions); Gillette, Risk of Project Failure and Definition of 'Debt," 6 MUN. FIN. J. 311
(1985) (succinct analysis of how courts should approach issue of what constitutes debt).
47. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 4.
48. Id. at 43-45, 119-23; R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 25, at 70. In a review of the
studies that have been conducted to measure default risk, it was found that "the most important
determinant of variations in yields across tax-exempt bonds" was the rating category. Cook, supra
note 39, at 25.
49. Cook, supra note 39, at 25. Studies indicate that the differential widens as the maturity
lengthens. Id. Issues rated below investment grade are often termed "speculative," and as a general
rule are not purchased by institutional investors, either because of government regulations restricting
investment to investment grade bonds or because their fiduciary obligation to act in a prudent man-
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rated competitively bid issues receive more bids than lower rated issues, 50
and that the more bids received, the lower the yields to maturity, and
hence the lower the borrowing costs for the issuer.5 1
High credit ratings are not, however, a guarantee of lower interest
costs if the issue is small and unknown in the marketplace. Both in the
original issue market and the secondary market, bonds of small issuers
are priced at higher yields than those of larger issuers with comparable
ratings. The ratings are not sufficient by themselves to overcome the
problem of marketability for lesser known issuers. 2
ner in making investment decisions results in such restrictions. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra
note 25, at 69; see also J. PETERSON, supra note 30, at 64-67.
50. Cook, supra note 39, at 27.
51. Kessel, A Study of the Effects of Competition on the Tax-Exempt Bond Market, 79 J. POL.
ECON. 706, 723-32 (1971). Kessel found that the reoffering prices increase (yields decrease) as com-
petition among underwriters, evidenced by the number of bids, increases. Id. at 707. The reasons for
the positive correlation between the number of bids and yield are the subject of much debate. Kessel
theorizes that because underwriters know what customers will pay for bonds, the larger the number
of bids, the greater the probability of discovering the underwriter in possession of the knowledge of
who will pay the most for a prospective issue: "Mhis is apt to be the underwriter who submits the
winning bid." Id. at 729. The increase in bids means that a more extensive search has been con-
ducted. Others have argued that the number of bids is a reflection of the lower underwriting costs
associated with high quality bonds, because of both inherent credit qualities and marketability.
Since, with competitive bidding, underwriters are not assured of having the winning bid, there are
less costs at stake in bidding on issues of high quality and marketability in that pre-bidding search
costs are minimal. Schaeffer & Smith, Debating Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue Bonds, 5
SEC. INDUSTRY TRENDS 1, 4 (Jan. 30, 1979) (summarizing study conducted by Professor Michael
Mussa). See generally Cook, supra note 39, at 29-31 (discussing literature regarding correlation be-
tween number of bids and reoffering prices).
52. The higher yields are primarily a reflection of lack of marketability for small issues. Small
issues are unlikely to have a secondary market. This inability to market at a later point, except,
perhaps, at significant costs, is taken into account when the bonds are initially priced. Investors
seek a higher yield to compensate them for their potential losses should they be forced to sell before
maturity. It is estimated that the cost of selling in the secondary market for a lesser known issuer
may be as high as $5 per $100. Cook, supra note 39, at 30, 33. The cost of trading in the secondary
market is higher for small issues even when limited to trades in their own regional markets domi-
nated by regional dealers, where presumably such bonds should be more marketable. Stoats, The
Secondary Market for State and Local Government Bonds, in REAPPRAISAL OF THE FEDERAL RE-
SERVE DIscouNT MECHANISM 9 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. ed. 1972).
A study analyzing bond yields in 1960, 1963, and 1967, showed that the size of the issue was a
significant factor in bond yields, particularly when commercial banks were the dominant trader, due
to their preference for large block investment. Hastie, Deterninants of Municipal Bond Yields, 8 J.
FIN.& QUANrIATIVE ANALYSIS 1729, 1748 (1972). In addition, more effort is needed to search
out initial investors for smaller issues, thereby raising underwriting costs. JEC REPORT, supra note
6, at 249. Because of the difficulty in marketing, small issues tend to receive fewer bids in competitive
bidding and are the subject of negotiated sale more often. R. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 131.
Increased yields thus may reflect either the behavior of investors or underwriters or both. See supra
note 51.
For small issuers that are unrated (approximately 40% of the number of issues, but only 10-15%
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The rapid growth of private insurance for municipal securities in the
last ten years suggests that, whatever the historical record of default for
municipals may indicate, investors are increasingly concerned about the
credit risks involved in investment in municipal securities. In 1983, 14%
of the new issues were insured as compared with 3% in 1980; in 1984,
the amount was 21%, and in 1985, the percentage grew to 27%.11 Ten
years ago the amount of insured bonds was negligible.14 It can be argued
that the availability of insurance assures low credit risk. This is probably
not so. To see why, examine the market's reaction to insurance. Thus far,
Moody's has rated two municipal insurers triple A. Issues backed by
other insurance companies continue to be rated by Moody's on the basis
of the underlying issuer's credit. Standard & Poor's rates insured issues
on the basis of the credit rating of the insurer and has rated a number of
municipal insurers triple A. 5 Yet, even where the insured bonds carry a
triple A rating, they are priced in the market more like single A or
double A rated bonds in recognition of the limitations inherent in insur-
ance on long-term obligations. Should one or more of the large issuers
default, the insurance companies may not be able to meet their
obligations.5 6
3. Other Factors. There is one final consideration in connection
with the use of the low default rate since the Depression as a justification
for exempting municipal issuers from mandatory disclosure: this default
rate was achieved in a period of prosperity. During the Depression, 4,770
of the dollar volume), issuers pay, on average, 30 basis points more than single A rated bonds that
are otherwise similar. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 131, 133.
53. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1984, at Dl, col. 2; THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 20, 1985, at 1; THE
BOND BUYER, Apr. 16, 1986, at 4.
54. In 1974, the two municipal bond insurance companies, American Municipal Bond Assur-
ance Corporation and the Municipal Bond Insurance Corporation, insured a total of 24 issues. The
total insurance for that year was $63 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, at F10, col. 2. See also
Joehnk & Kidwell, Determining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Municipal Bond Guar-
antees, 7 GOVERNMENTAL FIN. 30 (1978).
55. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1984, at D1, col. 2; Telephone interview with Michael Beauchamps of
Moody's Investors Service (May 16, 1986).
56. Feldstein, Municipal Bond Insurance and Pricing, in 1 THE MUNICIPAL BOND HANDBOOK
404 (1983). As an example of the uncertainty with respect to insurance, one insurance company,
rated triple A by Standard & Poor's in 1985, was down-rated in April, 1986, to double A, because of
poor underwriting results. The rating change affected $1.1 billion in principal amount of bonds.
Nevertheless, insurance can provide significant savings in interest costs over the life of a long-
term bond and, therefore, is attractive not only for low rated issuers, but also for all small issuers,
regardless of credit standing, whose bonds are less liquid than those of larger, more well-known
issuers. The first two states to utilize bond insurance were (not surprisingly) New York and
Washington.
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municipal issuers defaulted on approximately 9% of the outstanding mu-
nicipal bonds.5 7 Although much of that debt was ultimately repaid, an-
other depression may find larger numbers of municipal issuers in default
due to fundamental changes in the market and the financing of public
services. Revenue bond financing constituted a small portion of the out-
standing debt issues prior to the mid-forties.58 In bad economic times, a
state or local government may permit its unsuccessful revenue bond
financings to go unpaid. While this will damage its reputation as a gen-
eral obligation issuer, reputational damage will not be as great if other
municipal issuers do likewise, as is likely. For large issuers, such as states
and major cities, the property tax is a less dominant form of tax revenue
than in previous years. 9 To the extent that these governments rely more
on income and sales taxes, their revenue sources have become more vul-
nerable to a sharp downturn in the economy. 60
B. Nature of Investors
The second justification traditionally given for the exemption of mu-
nicipal securities from mandated disclosure under federal law is that
those who invest in municipal securities are financial institutions and
wealthy individual purchasers who have sufficient financial sophistication
so as not to need such protection. The discussion that follows suggests
that individual investors have always played an important role in the
market, and today more so than ever. Morever, these individual investors
do not differ from corporate investors. Because a portion of the return on
57. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
58. See supra note 6.
59. Recent figures from the Bureau of the Census show that the property tax, as a percentage of
total state and local government tax revenues, has decreased from 24.4% in 1966-67, to 15% in
1981-82. At the local level, the property tax remains the dominant tax, constituting three-fourths of
local tax revenues; but as a percentage of total revenue, the property tax dropped 11 percentage
points in the decade between 1971-72 and 1981-82, from 36.3% to 25%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. BUREAU OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT, 4 GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES, No.
5, COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES xvii, xix (1984). The Bureau of the Census reports
that, for city governments, property taxes constituted 21.5% of their own source revenues in 1982-
83, down from 25.6% in 1975-76. Current charges (e.g., license fees and user fees) increased from
17.7% in 1975-76 to 25.7% in 1982-83, while non-property taxes increased from 16.6% to 19.7% in
the same periods. The statistics for the Census figures are based on data from cities with populations
of 25,000 or more. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CITY GOVERN-
MENT FINANCES IN 1982-3, at V (1984).
60. For example, the impact of the recession has been cited as one factor contributing to New
York City's fiscal problems, noting that the City relied more heavily on cyclically sensitive taxes--
sales and income taxes-than did other local governments serving metropolitan areas. Property
taxes as a percentage of total revenues for these governments was 62% in 1972-73, while for New
York the percentage was 42%. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 28, at 666.
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municipal securities comes in the form of the federal tax exemption for
the interest income,61 there is no question that they are attractive only to
those investors in sufficiently high marginal tax brackets to be able to
gain in after-tax income from the exemption.
H-istorically, there have been three major holders of municipal se-
curities: commercial banks, individual investors, and fire and casualty
insurance companies. 2 Over the years, the commercial banks and the
individual investors have seesawed back and forth as the dominant
source of investor funds. Whenever commercial banks have retreated
from the market, the slack has been picked up by individual investors.63
As a general matter, commercial bank investment in municipals re-
flects cyclical monetary conditions in the economy. When time deposits
outstrip loan demand, commercial banks participate more actively in the
municipal market; in periods of credit restraint, they withdraw from the
market and concentrate on meeting loan demand."4 Withdrawal from the
market by the banks, accompanied often by liquidation of their existing
municipal portfolios in the secondary market, drives up the cost of capi-
tal for government borrowers, since they are forced to increase the yield
on their securities to make them more attractive to lower tax bracket
individual investors.6" Commercial bank investors have been primarily
interested in only a portion of the municipal securities market. Their
preference for shorter maturities (one to ten years) for liquidity reasons is
61. Although the question-whether the exemption from federal taxation is constitutionally re-
quired under the doctrine of reciprocal immunity between the states and the federal government-
has not been definitively answered by the Supreme Court since the enactment of the sixteenth
amendment to the Constitution, the exemption has been provided by statute since 1913. I.R.C.
§ 103(a) (West Supp. 1987).
62. Doty & Petersen, supra note 29, at 326.
63. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE
MARKET FOR STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 35-40 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
CHANGING CONDITIONS] (discussing behavior of commercial banks and other institutional investors
with regard to municipal bonds between 1960 and 1975); R. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 67-100
(examining practices and policies of principal groups of investors in municipal securities); L. MOAK,
supra note 6, at 68-75 (analyzing behavior of major investors in municipal securities markets).
64. See CHANGING CONDITIONS, supra note 63, at 35-40.
65. Id. at 39; JEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 328; Staats, supra note 52, at 16-17. The municipal
securities market is characterized by a higher degree of price volitility than that of either the corpo-
rate bond or U.S. Treasury bond market. R. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 69. This volitility is attrib-
uted in large part to the "shifting composition of the market," particularly between commercial
banks and individuals. Id. at 70. "State and local obligations are the second choice of many inves-
tors, the first choice of a very few." Id. at 99. For a discussion of the effects of commercial bank
activity in the secondary municipal securities market on prices, supporting the finding that the buy-
ing or selling of municipal securities by commercial banks results in greater fluctuations in municipal
bond yields, see also Staats, supra note 52, at 17.
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reflected in the yield curve for municipals, with the longer maturities
consistently carrying higher yields to attract the individual investor.66
While commercial banks continue to be a major force in the munici-
pal market, figures from the last fifteen years indicate that individual in-
vestors are now consistently the main purchasers of municipal
securities. 7 This shift reflects a changing tax picture for both commercial
banks and individuals alike. For the banks, the 1970s saw the growth of
other tax shelter devices that, for the now more aggressive commercial
banking industry, were seen as more attractive than tax exempt securi-
ties. 8 Deregulation of interest rates paid on bank deposits in 1980 added
to the pressure on banks to seek out higher yield investments. 69 The
availability of these other opportunities for investment not only caused a
decline in bank activity in the municipal market as a whole, it skewed
bank participation toward the smaller banks for whom these other in-
vestment opportunities were not viable alternatives.70
Municipal issuers faced with lower bank demand responded with
higher yield securities in smaller denominations and often with shorter
maturities to lure more individual investors into the market.71 Sustained
individual investor interest in municipals stems from another factor as
66. "Individuals represent the marginal investor at longer maturities, and because they pay
taxes at lower rates, longer term municipal yields are a much higher proportion of longer-term
taxable yields." Koch, Recent Developments Affecting the Slope of the Municipal Yield Curve, 5
MuN. FiN. J. 137, 138 (1984). Koch's study of municipal yield spreads between shorter and longer
term maturities finds that the dominance of individuals in the market today, combined with a wider
perception that investment in municipals is more risky, has increased the slope of the yield curve
significantly. Id. To the extent the higher yields reflect a default risk premium, another recent study
suggests that the term to maturity effect on default risk premiums varies countercyclically, that is,
the yields increase during recessions despite otherwise lower interest rates. Leonard, The Behavior of
Municipal Bond Default Risk Premiums, 4 MUN. FIN. J. 14, 18 (1983).
67. Commercial banks' share of the municipal securities market has been steadily declining
since 1972. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. In 1972, household purchases (including mutual
funds) were approximatey 16% of the new issues of municipals; in 1982 they purchased 87% of the
new issues. Id. at 22. Purchases by mutual funds increased from 13% in 1981 to 23% in 1982. Koch,
supra note 66, at 146.
68. Kimball, Commercial Banks, Tax Avoidance, and the Market for State and Local Debt Since
1970, NEw ENG. ECON. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 3, 9-16; CHANGING CONDMONS, supra note 63, at
38.
69. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 21; Koch, supra note 66, at 143.
70. Kimball, supra note 68, at 17, 20.
71. For example, the use of zero coupon bonds and variable rate bonds. Zero coupon bonds do
not pay interest and are heavily discounted when sold. The advantage to the investor is low purchase
price with automatic reinvestment of interest at a compound rate. Amdursky, Creative State and
Local Financing Techniques, in 3 ANN. INST. ON MUN. FIN. L. 343, 382 (1984). One commentator
suggests that "[z]eros... are suited only for those investors who can do without investment income
and want a very certain return." Investors who fit this definition are likely to be individuals rather
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well: inflation resulted in more individuals in higher tax brackets who
sought relatively low-risk tax shelters. In 1983, individual purchases ac-
counted for approximately three-fourths of new bond sales.72 Banks and
insurance companies are generally restricted to investment grade securi-
ties, and the evidence is that most investment by financial institutions is
in the higher grade securities.73 For low rated issues or less well-known
issuers, the market is dominated by individual investors.74
Large and frequent issuers in the market appear especially to rely on
individual purchases. Inquiries into who owned New York City and
WPPSS bonds have shown that the securities of these issuers were widely
held by individuals. It is estimated that at the time of New York City's
crisis, there were 160,000 individual holders of the City's long-term
bonds, holding approximately two-thirds of its long-term debt." Over
60% of those responding to questionnaires sent by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") to individual investors in the City's notes
indicated they had never previously invested in the municipal market.76
Preliminary evidence in the WPPSS default shows increasing individual
participation in the 1979-81 period when the institutional market was
both saturated with WPPSS bonds and growing leery of the prospects for
Plants 4 and 5. In a 1980 offering of $130 million, $95 million worth of
bonds were sold to retail customers."
A variety of evidence suggests that, today, the wealth of investors in
the unregulated municipal securities market is similar to that of investors
in the regulated corporate securities market. The medium income for
corporate shareholders is $36,800.78 A Moody's comparison of yields on
municipals, taxable corporate bonds and long-term treasury bills as of
October, 1983, showed that municipals began to be attractive to individ-
than institutions. Langley, Variable Rate Bonds and Zero-Coupon Bonds, in 1 THE MUNICIPAL
BOND HANDBOOK 375 (1983).
Variable rate demand instruments have a floating interest rate and "put" features that require the
issuer to repurchase if so requested by the holder when the interest rates are reset. It has been
reported that as of November, 1984, $6.3 billion variable rate demand instruments had been sold,
primarily to tax-exempt money market funds. Pun. SEC. ASSOC., MUNICIPAL MARKET DEVELOP-
MENTS 4 (Nov. 30, 1984); see also Langley, supra, at 378-79 (discussing features of this type of
municipal security).
72. Koch, supra note 66, at 146.
73. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 25, at 69; J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 64-67.
74. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 67.
75. See supra note 34.
76. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 7, at 1.
77. Gleckman, supra note 34, at 32.
78. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Facts (Dec. 4, 1985).
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uals in the 30% tax bracket.79 Similarly, two current "how to" books on
investment in tax-exempt bonds use the family income figures of
$25,000'o and $30,0001 as the level at which individuals would begin to
find municipal bonds to be an "advantageous form of investment. '8 2
A significant portion of less wealthy investors in both the municipal
and corporate markets are indirect participants in the sense that they
utilize mutual funds. But even if the "typical" municipal bond investor is
wealthy, the same is true for the "typical" corporate shareholder who is
given the protection of the securities laws. 3 Moreover, it is clear from
the high degree of reliance on ratings by all investors in municipal securi-
ties that sources of information for investors are extremely limited.8 4
There is a modem supplement to the traditional rationale that mu-
nicipal disclosure need not be regulated because of the nature of the in-
vestors. The argument is that no investor, rich or poor, corporate or
municipal, needs protection against poor quality disclosure by issuers be-
cause he can protect himself against the associated risks by diversifica-
tion. One problem with this argument, applicable to corporate and
municipal securities alike, has already been considered: accurate securi-
ties prices are needed for the efficient allocation of resources, and accu-
rate prices depend on accurate information.86
A second problem with the argument relates directly to what is be-
ing discussed here: the nature of investors in the municipal market. Both
individual and bank investors in the municipal market are less protected
79. THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 31, 1983, at 47.
80. H. RICHELSON & S. RICHELSON, INCOME WITHOUT TAXES, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS, 5 (1985).
81. R. LAMB, How TO INVEST IN MUNICIPAL BONDS, at ix (1984).
82. Id.
83. Fifty percent of stock holdings are held by the 2% of families with incomes over $100,000.
Survey of Consumer Finances, 1983, 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 679, 689 (1984). Corporate bond
holdings are overwhelmingly institutional. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH
CONG., IST SESS., CORPORATE BOND RISK PREMIUMS AND PUBLIC POLICIES 13 (Comm. Print
1985)(report for use of Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance).
84. Petersen's 1974 study of the role of ratings of the municipal securities market, which is to
date the only comprehensive study of the rating process, found that both commerical banks and
individuals relied extensively on ratings for their investment decisions. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30,
at 62-72. Lamb and Rappaport's study of the municipal bond market, published in 1980, supports
Petersen's earlier findings. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 25, at 48-49.
The ratings were recently described as "the benchmark in our business for determining invest-
ment grade and investment portfolio decisions .... Bonneville Hearings, supra note 34, at 115
(statement of Eileen V. Titmuss, Vice-President of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc.).
85. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule
415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 182-84 (1984).
86. See supra Section II.
[Vol. 36
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
against the risk of default than investors in the corporate market in that
their portfolios are likely to be less diversified. The municipal market,
particularly the secondary market, has a strong regional bias; investors
tend to concentrate their holdings in the securities of issuers within their
state of residence or those of neighboring states.8 7 One reason for this is
the taxing policy of most states, which is to exempt from state taxation
interest earned on their own securities or those of their political subdivi-
sions."8 For example, unit trusts and bond funds are often composed of
securities of a single state.8 9
A second reason for this regional bias is related to the general lack
of information about the myriad municipal issuers in the market. Inves-
tors purchase securities of local issuers because they have more personal
information about those issuers and about the economic and demo-
graphic factors at play within the region in which they reside or do busi-
ness. Commercial banks, as both major investors and major underwriters
of municipal securities, 90 are particularly subject to local pressures, aris-
ing out of their positions in the community and out of concern for ongo-
ing banking relationships, to support their own state and local
government units by bidding on, purchasing, and retaining until matur-
ity, the offered securities. Their portfolios tend, therefore, to be less geo-
graphically diversified.91 But, as the credit problems of New York State
and its cities and agencies in the mid-seventies clearly demonstrated, the
economic fortunes of states and their subdivisions are intertwined. Both
87. R. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 149-50; Staats, supra note 52, at 9; R. LAMB & S. RAP-
PAPORT, supra note 25, at 48-49.
88. Staats, supra note 52, at 11; Feldstein & Fabozzi, Tax Exempt Securities, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 400 (1983). The state tax exemption also effects yields. Feld-
stein and Fabozzi report that in high income tax states that also exempt interest income on their own
bonds (e.g., New York), the bonds of such states yield less than otherwise identical investments from
other states because the availability of the exemption creates a "strong investor demand" for in-state
issues and thus reduces yield. Id.
89. R. LAMB, supra note 81, at 66.
90. The Glass-Steagall Banking Reform Act of 1933, which prohibits commercial banks from
acting as underwriters of securities, exempts general obligation bonds from its prohibition. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 64a, 221a, 378-78a (1933). In the past, commercial banks, as underwriters, dominated the mar-
keting of general obligation bonds. The growth of revenue bonds at the expense of general obligation
bonds has cut back the commercial banks' level of activity. A comparison of the 10 leading under-
writers in 1969 with those in 1979 reveals that the first two underwriters in 1969 were commercial
banks; in 1979, no bank was on the list. Forbes, Fischer & Petersensupra note 44, at 180-81. The
Senate Banking Committee is currently considering the question of whether to permit banks to un-
derwrite revenue bonds. The SEC supports this expansion. THE BOND BUYER, May 23, 1986, at 1.
91. Hendershott & Kidwell, The Impact of Relative Security Supplies, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 337, 338-40 (1978). See also R. ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 104-06 (discussing special
character of bank underwriting activities with respect to municipal securities).
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the problems of New York City and WPPSS led to higher interest rates
for issuers within the region in general.92
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MARKET INCENTIVES THEORIES OF
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE TO THE MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES MARKET
This Section explores the recent arguments being advanced for mod-
ification or elimination of mandatory disclosure for corporate issuers and
considers whether application of these arguments to municipal issuers
forms a more satisfactory alternative justification for their continued ex-
emption from mandatory disclosure. The conclusion is that they are not.
This determination is based on what is known in public choice theory
and organization theory about differences in behavior between corporate
managers and political and bureaucratic officials.
A. Arguments Against Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
The disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act that mandate, in con-
nection with the public offering of corporate securities, the filing of a
registration statement and the distribution of a prospectus, each contain-
ing detailed information as to the nature of the issuer, its business, and
financial position, are predicated on the beliefs that the production and
distribution of such information is necessary to prevent misrepresenta-
tion and fraud in the sale of securities, and that investors should partici-
pate in the market with equal access to information.93 The need for, and
effectiveness of, the mandatory disclosure requirements have recently
been the subject of much debate growing out of both theoretical and em-
pirical work in economics. 4 This literature suggests that the forced pro-
duction of information is not required to protect investors in the
corporate securities market and that it is inefficient because some of the
92. See supra note 38.
93. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 118-28 (2d ed. 1961) (describing how
reaction to events of 1929-33 influenced Congress' regulation of securities market).
94. Jensen and Meckling developed what is often referred to as the "agency theory" of the firm.
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). In firms where management is
separate from share ownership, voluntary disclosure, nevertheless, will come about through contrac-
tual arrangements between managers and outside shareowners, which contracts align management's
interests with those of the outside equity holders. A related theory-signaling theory-also suggests
that the market provides sufficient incentives for voluntary disclosure. Since good news is willingly
disclosed to increase share price, other firms are put under pressure to release information lest their
failure to do so be perceived to be bad news. Ross, The Economics of Information and Disclosure
Regulation Debate, in IssUEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION (F. Edwards ed. 1979). See also Easter-
brook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682-83
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required information costs more to generate and disclose than it is worth
to investors.95 Thus, even if the traditional justifications for exempting
municipal issuers from a system of mandatory disclosure do not persua-
sively establish that municipal issuers should be treated differently from
corporate issuers, perhaps neither, rather than both, should be subjected
to such a system. The literature opposed to mandatory corporate disclo-
sure is controversial, but it is being taken seriously by legal scholars. 96
This suggests that the debate concerning the regulation of municipal dis-
closure would be significantly advanced by a review of this literature and,
under the assumption that it has at least some merit, an examination of
its applicability to municipal issuers.
The theoretical literature opposed to mandatory corporate disclo-
sure identifies a number of forces that should lead a firm's management
voluntarily to pursue a disclosure policy that maximizes share price, and
suggests that such a policy is socially optimal. According to the theory,
management will become concerned with share price as soon as it con-
templates offering shares to outsiders. The higher the price, the greater
the managerial gain from the sale. If management assures prospective
purchasers that the firm will pursue a disclosure policy that maximizes
(1984) (suggesting that both agency theory and signaling theory operate to produce disclosure
"worthwhile to investors" without resort to mandatory rules).
The works of Professors George Stigler and George Benston have attempted to prove empirically
that the costs of the current mandatory corporate disclosure system outweigh any benefits. See, ag.,
Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964); Benston, The Costs and
Benefits of Government Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements: An Appraisal, in CORPO-
RATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 37 (D. DeMott ed. 1980). Their find-
ings have been challenged by others. See, eg., Friend & Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly,
37 J. Bus. 382 (1964) (responding to the Stigler study); Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 12-51 (1985) (refuting Benston's contention
that securities fraud was not widespread prior to enactment of federal securities laws). See also
Mendelson, Economics and The Assessment of Disclosure Requirements, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC.
REG. 49 (1978) (discussing debate on benefits of mandatory corporate disclosure).
95. Professor Stigler concluded that "grave doubts exist whether, if account is taken of the costs
of regulation, the S.E.C. has saved the purchasers of new issues one dollar." Stigler, supra note 94, at
142. Similarly, Professor Benston asserts that "[1]ittle, if any, evidence supports the belief that these
[claimed benefits by proponents of mandatory disclosure] have been achieved .... [R]eason does not
support belief that the benefits claimed can be achieved or are indeed benefits .... Benston, supra
note 94, at 49-50.
96. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE (1979); N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION (1984); Easterbrook, Managers' Dis-
cretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1985); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 94; cf. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
tract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985) (taking issue with notion underlying agency theory that
investors knowingly enter into contracts with management regarding management's obligations and
degree of discretion).
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the value of the shares, these investors will offer the highest price for the
shares. 97 Once the shares are issued, management will, for a number of
reasons, continue to be concerned with the price at which the shares
trade. First, the firm may wish, from time to time, to raise funds by issu-
ing additional shares. Second, share price is a significant factor in deter-
mining the vulnerability of the firm's management to replacement by a
hostile takeover.98 Third, management compensation schemes are often
directly tied to share price.9 9 Fourth, high share price can also enhance
the price at which individual members of the management team can sell
their services to others should they choose to leave the firm; and the
existence of such lucrative outside opportunities increases their compen-
sation if they choose instead to stay with the firm."°
One kind of information of value to outside shareholders concerns
the performance of management. The need for this information arises
because of the separation of ownership and control in the typical modem
corporation. 10 ' The less equity managers have in the firm, the more likely
they will fail to act in the interests of shareholders to maximize profits. 102
Rather, they will have an interest in extracting additional compensation
at the expense of shareholders in the form of salary, perquisites, shirking
of responsibilities or insider trading.103 Such behavior lowers the overall
value of the firm in terms of what, in the aggregate, it offers the manage-
ment and the shareholders.t°4 Agency theory suggests that, to the extent
management can create expectations at the time of the initial offering of
shares to outsiders that it will not engage in such behavior, the resultant
increase in share price will be such that management will gain more than
it loses. Thus, management will agree to subject itself to various monitor-
ing devices, such as periodic audits, to measure management's perform-
97. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94, at 325-26.
98. Empirical studies support a finding that "relatively unprofitable and/or undervalued corpo-
rations do run a somewhat greater risk of being taken over." F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 37 (2d ed. 1980).
99. Id. at 36. See also Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 560-62 (reviewing recent literature con-
cerning relationship between management's compensation and performance of the firm).
100. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
101. This phenomenon, identified by Berle and Means, is the rule, rather than the exception,
with respect to the large corporations that control significant shares of our economy's industrial
assets. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see
also Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Undenvriters Due Diligence: An Economic
Analysis, 70 VA. L, REV. 1005, 1019 n.43 (1984) (containing statistics as to number and magnitude
of management controlled corporations).
102. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94, at 313.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 328.
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ance.105 Similarly, management's interests can be better aligned with
shareholder interests by providing for share-price based compensation,
again with the aim that management's share of the profits earned
through the more efficient operation of the firm will exceed the value of
its loss in personal consumption of the firm's resources. 10 6
Continuing managerial interest in share price is likely to create
other forces for disclosure that go beyond the mechanisms put in place at
the time of the initial offering. As a general matter, a firm that has a
"following" of security analysts will do better in the market. A firm can-
not obtain such a following without providing the kinds of information
that the analysts demand."0 7 Also, signaling theory suggests that once
firms disclose such information as a "signal" to the market, other firms
are forced to provide on-going information to avoid the inference of bad
news.t'0 This contributes to the development of a consensus among ana-
lysts as to what information firms ought to supply, and those unwilling to
meet the standard will be penalized in the form of lower share price.109
Information is useful to investors only if it is accurate. Investors will
want, therefore, verified, or at least verifiable, information in order to
distinguish among all the statements being made in the marketplace. To
meet this demand, management allows independent review by outsiders
as part of the monitoring of its performance. The most common form of
verification is the use of independently certified financial statements.' °
Investment bankers, with their own reputations at stake as financial in-
termediaries, also act as verifiers of the information transmitted by them
from firms to investors and, hence, are motivated to ensure the accuracy
of the information."' It has been suggested that the role of the invest-
ment banker as verifier explains the use of syndications: a larger number
of firms participating in underwriting "increase[s] the amount of reputa-
tional capital put behind the offering.""' 2 In addition to allowing inves-
105. Id. at 324.
106. Id. at 328; Masson, Executive Motivations, Earnings and Consequent Equity Performance,
79 J. POL. ECON. 1278 (1971).
107. H. KRIPKE, supra note 96, at 123-24.
108. Ross, supra note 94, at 185.
109. H. KRIPKE, supra note 96, at 124.
110. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 94, at 338-39. Professors Watts and Zimmerman find sup-
port for the agency theory in the history of audits, which, their research shows, have long been
employed as a voluntary monitoring device of firms. Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Audit-
ing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1983).
ill. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 618
(1984).
112. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 94, at 675.
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tors (existing and prospective) to monitor management's activities,
management, wishing to distinguish itself from other firms, may also in-
cur certain "bonding costs" in conjunction with providing accurate infor-
mation. It will take actions such as personal guarantees, salary cuts, high
debt/equity ratio, etc., in an attempt to vouch for the accuracy of, and its
commitment to, its statements. 13 Even without such outside review and
bonding costs, managers, unless they have only a very short time hori-
zon, can be expected to strive for accuracy in the information they pro-
vide the market. Overly optimistic statements today improve share price
temporarily but, over the long run, they depress share price because they
damage management's credibility.
B. Are the Arguments Against Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
Applicable to Municipal Issuers?
Assuming, arguendo, that firms and investors in the corporate se-
curities market act in the manner described by the market incentives the-
ories, therefore making mandatory corporate disclosure unnecessary,
how valid are these incentive theories as applied to municipal issuers?
Will government officials respond to the same incentives? The studies of
bureaucratic behavior of not-for-profit organizations in general, and
studies of government institutions in particular, suggest that the goals
and motivations of government officials are sufficiently different from the
agents of profit-making institutions to make doubtful the application of
these theories to the municipal securities market.' 1 4
According to the incentives theories, corporate management will, as
we have seen, disclose all the information that investors want because it
is motivated to promote as high a share price as possible, both at the time
initial outside financing is sought and on an ongoing basis thereafter.
Higher share price leads to higher management compensation and
greater job security. The information that investors want is straightfor-
ward: what is management doing to maximize the long run profitability
of the firm. It might be argued that investors in government debt instru-
ments would put the same kinds of pressures for disclosure on govern-
113. Ross, supra note 94, at 185-86; see also Grossman & Hart, Corporate Financial Structure
and Managerial Incentives, in THE EcONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (J. Mc-
Call ed. 1982) (discussing use of issuing debt as a bonding device). Since the issuance of debt creates
the risk of bankruptcy, which if it becomes a reality will cause management to lose the benefits it
derives from the firm, management would prefer an all equity financial structure. By issuing debt,
management signals that it will profit-maximize in order to avoid bankruptcy, and that signal, in
turn, increases the market value of the firm.
114. See infra notes 121, 137, 139-45 and accompanying text.
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ment agents as shareholders do on corporate managers. Such an
argument would be based on the assumption that government managers
will act to provide those public services desired by its citizens at the low-
est cost possible. If that is true and disclosure of needed information re-
sults in lower interest costs on borrowings, government managers, acting
rationally, will disclose such information, just as corporate managers
would do.115
The problem with this argument is two-fold. First, the personal wel-
fare of a government manager is not directly tied to the financial health
of his institution. Both politicians and bureaucrats are likely to see per-
sonal advantage in sponsoring increased public services, regardless of
cost. Second, citizens, who through their votes constitute the ultimate
check on the decisions of government managers concerning borrowing
and the size and direction of government programs, themselves lack the
information necessary to perform this role effectively. Thus, neither the
carrot nor the stick form of incentive is at work in the municipal securi-
ties market.
An accurate picture of the disclosure behavior of municipal issuers
requires a comprehensive survey of the goals and incentives of the man-
agers of government-political leaders and government bureaucrats-
and of the information monitoring undertaken by legislators, citizens, in-
terest groups, investors, and underwriters. Such a survey is set forth in
the following Sections.
1. Goals and Incentives.
a. Politicians. The goals of politicians and the inherent limitations
on their control over government bureaucracy make it unlikely that the
process of deciding on government expenditures will be one in which, if
unregulated, information is gathered, processed and transmitted to the
relevant participants, including municipal securities investors, in a fash-
ion that will promote the efficient allocation of resources and, when
needed, adjustments in the level of government spending. Politicians are
more than high-level managers; they have symbolic functions as leaders
of the community. Citizens make political decisions based upon limited
information, and the consequences of government actions often are not
clearly discernible. In such a world, citizens respond favorably to politi-
cians who can provide them with assurance of command, of knowing
115. Professor Kripke indirectly makes this argument by suggesting that municipal issuers will
voluntarily supply the information required by underwriters and investors once all parties are aware
of their antifraud liabilities under the 1934 Act. H. KRIPKE, supra note 96, at 129-30.
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how to deal with society's problems, even if the actual effectiveness of
their acts is limited. Promises may, in fact, be more important than
deeds.1 1 6
For most politicians, the primary goal is either reelection or ap-
pointment to a higher public position. Their terms in office are short. In
order to secure this goal, they need to develop, in a short period of time,
the appearance of being decisive, strong leaders. This need leads to a
myopic vision of the world with an emphasis on short-term gains. 1 7 Any
long-term losses will be discounted since they will not be felt during the
incumbent's term in office.118 In contrast, information concerning the
long-run future performance of a corporate firm, once that information is
known by a few outside observers, is taken into account (through the
mechanisms of the efficient market hypothesis) in the price of the firm's
shares-something of immediate concern to management.
Politicians are consequently attracted to those acts or programs that
will produce tangible results relatively quickly. Capital improvements, in
particular, are tangible testimony to a politician's ability to get things
done." 9 The continuing survival of state constitutional debt limits, de-
spite their ineffectiveness in curtailing long-term debt financing, can be
seen as the public's demand for at least a symbolic antidote to the bias of
politicians to disregard future costs.
Against this background, bad economic news is very bad indeed for
116. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 75-94 (1964) (describing symbolic
role of politicians as leaders in American society). Professor Edelman argues that the ability to
project competence, an aura of command, and an assumption of responsibility, is more important
psychologically to members of society than a politician's ultimate successes; these qualities reduce
society's anxiety about the environment in which they live. Similarly, Katz and Kahn, commenting
on the desire that political leaders be charismatic, state that "charisma is not the objective assess-
ment by followers of the leader's ability to meet their specific needs. It is a means by which people
abdicate responsibility for any consistent, tough-minded evaluation of the outcome of specific poli-
cies. They put their trust in their leader, who will somehow manage to take care of things." D. KATZ
& R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 545-46 (2d ed. 1978).
117. See R. AUSTER & M. SILVER, THE STATE AS A FIRM: ECONOMIC FORCES IN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 75 (1979); D. KATZ & R. KAHN, supra note 116, at 507.
118. For a discussion of the divergence of interests between the issuer and the local decision
maker (for example, politician) in the weighing of the economic costs associated with the issuance of
bonds, see Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1030, 1059-66 (1983). Professor Gillette notes that the individuals making the decision will discount
the costs to be borne by the issuer due to their "short-term need to survive the next election." Id. at
1062.
119. Id.; see also A. WALSH, supra note 46, at 234-35 (discussing this phenomenon in context of
productivity in public sector); P. MCCLELLAND & A. MAGDOVITZ, supra note 28, at 6-14 (describ-
ing relationship between politicians' motivations and creation of debt with regard to New York City
fiscal crisis).
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a politician. It requires curtailing capital and operating expenditures.
Various interest groups that would have been otherwise benefited (in-
cluding the voters constituting the bureaucracy of the government itself)
are disappointed and the politician risks losing their political support for
reelection. Moreover, bad economic news undermines the politician's
symbolic role as leader, as someone in control of events.12 0
The serious consequences of bad news creates blocks to timely
processing of information at all levels. Lower level appointees and bu-
reaucrats will tend to suppress bad news not wishing to displease their
superiors. 121 Politicians will tend to ignore what bad news is given them,
and information they do absorb is unlikely to be passed on to the
public. 122
The New York City fiscal crisis provides a useful example of this
phenomenon. The mayor at the time, Abraham Beame, had been Comp-
troller for New York City, first in Robert Wagner's administration from
1961 to 1965, and then during the second term of John V. Lindsay's
administration, 1969-73. He not only knew of certain of the City's finan-
cial gimmicks, he helped create many of them in order to allow the City
to continue to market its securities. 123 Yet, he steadfastly maintained, as
a public stance, that nothing was wrong, even after April, 1975, when the
markets had closed and New York City faced bankruptcy. He wanted to
retain the support of the citizens whom he would face for reelection in
two years. He also wanted to stave off state and federal involvement in
city finances, which would ultimately reduce his power as mayor. To
accomplish these ends, he appealed to local chauvinism by invoking the
symbolism of the "Big Apple." Nothing could be wrong with the nation's
largest city. Bondholders could not be hurt. The problem was with those
120. Professor Edelman notes that economic forces are "much more difficult to personify or
even to identify, so that a leader finds it hard to demonstrate his capacity for attacking them. There
is a strong chance the incumbent will look impotent." M. EDELMAN, supra note 116, at 82.
121. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 162-63 (3d ed. 1976); A. DOWNS, INSIDE
BUREAUCRACY 77 (1967). Subordinates who desire to advance will engage in "pleasing the sover-
eign" behavior, as Gordon Tullock refers to this recognized behavioral response of bureaucrats to
suppress bad news. Tullock's thesis is that pleasing the sovereign behavior causes "the ambitious and
intelligent bureaucrat [to] . . . cut himself off from external reality .... The official who is not
hypocritical about his task soon learns that an active curiosity leads either to quarrels with superiors
or bad conscience; hence he suppresses his curiosity." G. TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAU-
CRACY 70-71 (1965).
122. M. EDELMAN, supra note 116, at 82, 116; A. DOWNS, supra note 121, at 121-23. In addi-
tion to the desire to suppress unfavorable information, politicians may adopt a "wait and see" atti-
tude in order to determine the accuracy of the alarm signals being given before taking action. Id. at
189-90.
123. C. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 216.
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who sought to discredit the City.124
This appeal was not only aimed at the average citizen. At least one
study of the New York City fiscal crisis suggests that investment bankers
and other observers of City affairs failed to pick up more quickly on the
City's financial situation; they discounted the negative information being
conveyed to them as being inconsistent with their concept of the City in
which they lived and worked as the "Big Apple." '125
The impact of political appeals for citizen loyalty and support in the
face of economic reality can also be illustrated by an earlier event in New
York City's fiscal wars. In 1972, three years before the culmination of the
City's fiscal problems, Beame, then Comptroller, with some support from
the state comptroller, took on the rating agencies for the City's Baa rat-
ing, claiming the downgrading from an A rating cost the City $150 mil-
lion in "unnecessary" interest costs." 6 The downgrading of the City's
rating in the late sixties was attributed by Moody's, in large part, to the
City's practice of deficit financing.127 Beame's crusade led to congres-
sional hearings. By the end of 1972, Moody's raised the City's rating to
"A," where it remained until October, 1975, despite even greater deficits.
Moody's was later greatly criticized for continuing to rate the City's se-
curities "A" into 1975.128 Yet, in light of the consequences of the previ-
ous downgrading, when the City's fiscal crisis finally came to a head, it is
not surprising that Moody's waited until its decision to downgrade was
irrefutable.
The capacity of politicians encountering fiscal problems to engage in
symbolic appeals creates an additional problem: self-delusion. For exam-
ple, Mayor Beame's refusal to recognize the City's financial plight ap-
pears not to have been entirely a desperate attempt to salvage his political
career. He and other critical participants may, to some extent, have be-
lieved their own rhetoric.'2 9 The reluctance of political leaders to engage
in information disclosure goes beyond the instrumental goal of being re-
124. Beame consistently placed the blame for New York's fiscal problems on the City's bankers.
He faulted the bankers for not "talking up" New York's securities. P. MCCLELLAND & A.
MAGDOVrrZ, supra note 28, at 308. He repeatedly cited the bondholders' first lien position as proof
that the bondholders could not be harmed. C. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 224.
125. P. MCCLELLAND & A. MAGDOVITZ, supra note 28, at 308.
126. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 127. Petersen notes that the rating change in 1972 came one
day before hearings by the New York State Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Rating of
Tax-Exempt Bonds. Id. at 129.
127. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 13.
128. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
129. In 1976, Mayor Beame admitted: "I knew there were going to be problems, obviously, but
... nothing like this," P. MCCLELLAND & A. MAGDOVITZ, supra note 28, at 310. It is, moreover,
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elected or appointed to higher office. A political leader perceives his so-
cial role differently than does a corporate manager. The political leader is
likely to have a particular conception of the "public interest," and he
seeks political power in order to shape society in accordance with that
conception. 130 While disclosure may improve the functioning of govern-
mental processes generally, it is likely to weaken the politician's power,
and hence ability, to further the public interest as he has defined it.'
The tendency of politicians to suppress information in order to en-
hance their ability to further the public interest as they see it is not lim-
ited to bad news. For example, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey for years paid higher costs for borrowings and willingly
agreed to more severe restrictive covenants rather than make its financial
statements public. 132 The reason in this case for non-disclosure was not
to hide bad news but to hide good news. Its executive director at the time
was convinced that the public interest was best served by the continued
standing of the Port Authority's bonds as safe long-term investments,
which he believed would be threatened by involvement in mass transit
projects. If the Authority's current flush financial position were publicly
known, it might be forced to bow to the growing pressure from the sur-
rounding political entities for Port Authority participation in mass
transit. The higher costs incurred to raise capital were secondary to pre-
serving the organization's goals for long-run financial stability.'33
Often a politician's conception of the public interest leads him to
identify with a particular program (for example, nuclear power). Litera-
ture on organizational theory suggests that such an identification may
create biases in the decision-making processes of the organization. For
example, Herbert Simon maintains that the tendency of an administrator
difficult for the politician to "distinguish between what is 'good for me' and 'what is good' ". G.
TULLOCK, supra note 121, at 24.
130. J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 362-63 (1980) (distinguishing economics and
politics; suggesting that essence of politics is the effort of government to change people's
preferences).
131. Mayor Robert Wagner is quoted as having said: "I do not propose to permit our fiscal
problems to set the limits of our commitments to meet the essential needs of the people of this City,"
as an example of the fiscal irresponsibility of the City's leaders. P. MCCLELLAND & A. MAGDOVITZ,
supra note 28, at 322 (footnotes omitted). It can also be seen, in its best light, as a recognition of the
other factors concerning the public's interest that public officials must consider in addition to fiscal
impact.
132. For a discussion of the Port Authority's "willingness to sacrifice revenues and even some
bond marketability in order to defend the confidentiality of detailed financial data," see A. WALSH,
supra note 46, at 89-103.
133. Walsh finds that the Port Authority's behavior was just one example of the typical practice
of authorities to utilize financial restrictions to protect against "political interference." Id. at 156-57.
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who identifies himself with a particular goal is to measure his organiza-
tion "in terms of adequacy (the degree to which its goals have been
reached) [rather than] of efficiency (the degree to which the goals have
been reached relative to available resources)."' 134 To the extent disclosure
of bad news (such as increases in construction costs and extension of
completion dates) is viewed as decreasing the possibility of achieving the
goal, there will be a tendency to be less than forthcoming, even if the
subsequent damage to the issuer's credibility means that future issues of
debt will be more costly than would have been the case with full disclo-
sure. These higher future costs are justified in the mind of the political
leader because of the importance of attaining the goal.
b. Bureaucracy.
i. Importance of Bureaucracies in the Flow of Information. Govern-
ment bureaucracies gather or create most of the existing information that
is potentially useful to political leaders, voters, and investors in the per-
formance of their respective functions. First, bureaucracies possess infor-
mation concerning their own operations. This information is important
because bureaucracies are the means through which government services
are provided to the public. In addition, bureaucracies act as major gath-
erers of information regarding citizens' wants and needs and thus are key
factors in defining what the public interest is. In order to determine what
information, possessed by bureaucracies, will be made available volunta-
rily to investors (either directly or through political leaders), it is neces-
sary to examine the personal motivations of individual bureaucrats and
the relationship they have with their political superiors.
While bureaucracies and the problems they present in terms of effi-
cient management of organizations are not unique to governments, 135
134. H. SIMON, supra note 121, at 212. Simon further finds that identification with the organiza-
tional goals is "more frequent in public administration than in the administration of commercial
enterprises." Id. at 212 n. 17.
135. Bureaucracy is a term generally used to describe all large, typically hierarchal, organiza-
tions. Tullock, nhat is to be Done?, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERN-
MENT GROWTH 275 (. Borcherding ed. 1977) [hereinafter BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS].
Anthony Downs's study of bureaucracy defines four primary characteristics of a bureaucracy: (a)
large size; (b) most members are seriously committed to the bureau because they depend upon it for
most of their income; (c) advancement is based on performance; and (d) "the major portion of the
output is not directly or indirectly evaluated in any markets external to the organization by means of
voluntary quidpro quo transactions." A. DowNs, supra note 121, at 25. What distinguishes govern-
ment bureaucracies from other bureaucracies is "the type of constraints and the strength of the
constraints to which the bureaucracy is subject." Tullock, supra, at 281; see also Rosenbloom, Ac-
countability in the Administrative State, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN URBAN SOCIETY 87, 89-96 (1978)
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governmental bureaucracies play a greater role in the flow of information
within and outside the organization than their counterparts in private
firms. As a general matter, political leaders and their appointees, the per-
sons who are the top level managers in government, obtain their posi-
tions for reasons independent of any substantive knowledge of the
services for which they are responsible and often independent of any
demonstrated managerial skill. Their terms in office, moreover, are rela-
tively short compared with career and civil service bureaucrats. For these
reasons, the politicians and their top level appointees depend heavily on
the expertise of the bureaucracy in the operation of the various govern-
ment functions. This problem is aggravated by the fact that the informa-
tion possessed by the participants in a governmental organization tends
to be highly diverse and not easily translated into numbers that can be
aggregated to form a picture of the performance of the organization as a
whole. Thus, each individual governmental unit is likely to be the sole
repository of information as to its particular functions.
ii. Bureaucratic Motivations. In order to understand what bureau-
crats do with the information they possess, we need to review what the
literature says about basic bureaucratic behavior. It is almost axiomatic
to say that an essential goal of a bureaucracy is to increase its size.136 In
governmental organizations, where salaries generally are below those in
the private sector economy, many of the rewards of employment come in
the form of power, prestige, certainty of employment, and the "psychic
income" of working for the public interest.1 37 The strength of those re-
wards is dependent on growth. Increasing the size of a unit within a bu-
reaucracy enhances the position of the leader of that unit and buttresses
the chances of survival of the unit, which in turn assures lower level bu-
reaucrats of the certainty of employment with minimal conflict.13
The desire to expand, however, has implications beyond just the
number of personnel employed. Economists who have compared govern-
[hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY IN URBAN SOCIETY] (analyzing accountability problems presented
by special characteristics of bureaucracies).
136. See A. DowNs, supra note 121, at 16-18. Downs comments that "what sets bureaus apart
[from all other organizations which similarly have inherent tendencies to expand] is that they do not
have as many restraints upon expansion, nor do their restraints function automatically." Id. at 17.
See also D. KATZ & R. KAHN, supra note 116, at 98-119 (examining forces involved in life cycle of
organization that push it toward expansion).
137. See generally R. AUSTER & M. SILVER, supra note 117, at 77-83 (discussing characteristics
of public employment in democracies that provide non-pecuniary compensations as substitutes for
monetary profits).
138. A. DowNs, supra note 121, at 17, 18.
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ment output of goods and services with that of the private sector suggest
that government bureaucracies are not "cost minimizers.''139 One model
of bureaucratic behavior holds that government bureaucrats are "budget
maximizers" rather than profit-maximizers.1 4 Under this theory, gov-
ernmental units are motivated either to overproduce in terms of the opti-
mal level of output, but at minimum costs (that is, production efficient),
or to produce at optimal levels at higher costs (that is, production ineffi-
cient). A unit chooses the first route when its managers are unable to
utilize the difference between costs and the appropriated budget (the "fis-
cal residuum") in the form of salary or perquisites such as leisure time or
amenities. In such a situation, the budget can be expanded to provide
such increased rewards only by increasing output. On the other hand, a
unit chooses the second route if its managers are able to appropriate part
of the fiscal residuum as salary, perquisites or staff increases. In that case,
the fiscal residuum will be maximized by limiting output. 141
139. There are large bodies of literature examining the processes by which the preferences of
individuals within a community for public services are taken into account by their elected officials,
and the processes within the government bureaucracy for deciding on any given level of output of
public services. See, for example, the seminal work of J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); R.
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1976); see also R. BENNETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
PUBLIC FINANCE (1980) (reviewing literature of public finance in reference to how public choice
affects, and is affected by, where individual is located among different horizontal and vertical levels
of governments).
With respect to the economic study of government output, see generally W. NISKANEN, BUREAU-
CRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (develops a theory of supply of public services
based on economic behavior of bureaucrats); Baumol, The Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth:
The Anatomy of the Urban Crisis, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 415 (1967) (develops theory that because
production of most government services is labor intensive and non-progressive technologically, costs
continue to rise); Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617 (1975) (reflections on
the findings of certain empirical studies of government spending on Niskanen's earlier hypotheses).
140. This theory, advanced by William Niskanen in 1971, and refined in his subsequent article,
supra note 139, at 617, applies a utility maximization model to study the objectives of, and con-
straints on, the public bureau. W. NISKANEN, supra note 139. Because the various elements of a
bureaucrat's utility function, such as salary, perquisites, power, etc., are a positive monotonic func-
tion of the total budget, rational behavior and survival of the organization support the assumption
that bureaucrats are budget maximizers. Id. at 37-38; cf. J. WILSON, supra note 130, at 374-78
(suggesting that "careerists"---employees who identify their careers and rewards with a regulatory
agency-are not concerned as much with affirmatively seeking growth, as they are with avoiding a
crisis or scandal which would threaten their autonomy).
141. Niskanen applies a utility maximization model to the study of government bureaucratic
behavior. See Niskanen, supra note 139, at 617. For a review of three economic models of bureau-
cracy: Niskanen's model, Oliver Williamson's model, and Jean-Luc Migue's and Gerard Belanger's
model, see also Orzechowski, Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions, and Evidence, in
BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS, supra note 135, at 229-59. Williamson's model analyzes the neo-
classical firm, in which management, separated from the owners of the firm, appropriate, in the form
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A corollary of the budget maximizing and fiscal residuum theories is
the theory that government bureaucrats prefer production methods that
require heavy capital spending because they yield higher costs over a
shorter time span. 142 Others who have attempted to explain higher costs
in government production compared with the private sector suggest that
government bureaucracies make heavier use of labor because of bureau-
cratic managers' preferences for larger than needed staffs. 143 Larger staffs
generate more voters who will vote in favor of larger budgets, as well as
creating the potential for more prestige and power for unit managers. 44
These preferences are not necessarily mutually exclusive; pursuing both
simply implies bureaucratic behavior that is particularly costly for a
given level of output.145
iii. Information Control by Bureaucrats in the Budgetary Process.
The motivation of individual bureaucrats to maximize the budgets of the
units or subunits for which they are responsible influences both the way
information flows up through the bureaucracy to politicians in the execu-
tive branch and the kind of information that is provided to the legislature
in its budgetary function. Information in hierarchical organizations
originates at the lower levels and is transmitted up to the higher levels.
As we have seen, information that will have unpleasant consequences for
of larger staffs, a part of the fiscal residuum of the firm and thus produce at above minimum costs.
Migue's and Belanger's model "predicts that bureaus are both exchange and production inefficient."
Id. at 236. The Migue and Belanger paper led Niskanen to revise his theory to take into account the
appropriation of the fiscal residuum under certain circumstances. Niskanen, supra note 139, at617-
18.
142. De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment Choices, 59 AM.
EcON. REV. 13, 18-23 (1969).
143. Orzechowski, supra note 141, at 240.
144. Id. at 240-41. The bureaucrat, as voter, will desire more public goods than the non-bureau-
crat because greater output increases the bureaucrat's income and in effect subsidizes the bureau-
crat's purchase of public goods. Borcherding, Bush & Spann, The Effects on Public Spending of the
Divisibility of Public Outputs in Consumption, Bureaucratic Power, and the Size of the Tax Sharing
Group, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS, supra note 135, at 211, 216-20. Since, as at least one empir-
ical study has shown, government employees vote more than other groups, under majority rule, the
preferences of the medium voter will cause a shift toward more public output. Bush & Denzau, The
Voting Behavior of Bureaucrats and Public Sector Growth, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS, supra
note 135, at 90, 96-98.
145. Not everyone accepts the notion of a single economic motivation, such as budget maximiz-
ing, as the explanation of bureaucratic behavior. Seei e.g., J. WILSoN, supra note 130. Professor
Wilson emphasizes the bureau's desire for autonomy in order to assure security of position and to
pursue its own self-defined goals of the public interest. Under either theory of bureaucratic behavior
(and it is possible that at different points in time one or the other motivating force prevails), individ-
ual members of the bureau have reasons not to disclose information.
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the transmitter will be suppressed if possible.146 Conventional theory of
bureaucratic behavior holds that transmitted information will be dis-
torted in terms of the personal and institutional biases of bureaucrats, in
this case to increase their budgets. In government bureaucracies, the
problems of information distortion are greater in that the control systems
used to detect distortion and to measure performance are less effective. 147
The fact that the units that initiate and carry out programs are not
responsible for raising the funds to support their programs means that
there is no counter-balance to the pressures to expand within the unit,
other than the knowledge they will not get all that they ask for. The line
units are expected to be advocates of their individual causes before the
supervisory unit specializing in budgetary matters.'48 While the budget-
ary agency must choose among programs, its choices are ultimately polit-
ical ones subject to pressures from within and outside the organization.
Once the decisions are made, the current government's program is set
and there is a united front to finance it.
The tendency to manipulate information in order to budget maxi-
mize is not met with effective opposition, as might be expected, by the
political executives. For the politician whose motivation is election or
reelection, the bureaucracy presents a powerful special interest group. As
146. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. As a general matter, a hierarchical organi-
zation restricts the flow of information in that it inhibits communication between levels, from staff to
superior. Staff is "disincline[d] to discuss their problems with a superior for fear of revealing their
ignorance." P. BLAU & W. SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 131-32 (1962). Yet, because of the
restricted flow, a hierarchical structure facilitates coordination among large numbers of persons in
the performance of the tasks of the organization. See id. at 124-30.
147. For a discussion of the control mechanisms, see infra Section IV(B)(2). The difficulty in
detecting biases and distortions in government bureaucracies stems from both an inability to settle
upon objective measures of performance and often an inability to even agree upon the goals. A.
DOWNS, supra note 121, at 78.
[Tihe major objectives of many agencies and programs is to develop and maintain a
political consensus for their continued existence. In order to do so, program goals and
priorities may be obscured. Likewise, they may also be purely symbolic .... [W]ithout
knowing what an agency is supposed to do, much less how well it is doing it, it becomes
impossible to hold it accountable for its program activities in any meaningful fashion.
Rosenbloom, supra note 135, at 96.
At lower levels in the government bureaucracy, the work of the bureaucrat is characterized by
frequent interaction with citizens and by wide discretion in defining that interaction. It is rarely
accompanied by on-the-job supervision. Citizen participation is generally involuntary. As a result,
goals tend to be less focused, information is controlled by the bureaucrat, and the purchasers of the
services have limited, if any, opportunity to go elsewhere. Lipsky, The Assault on Human Services:
Street-level Bureaucrats, Accountability and the Fiscal Crisis, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN URBAN SOCI-
ETY, supra note 135, at 17-23.
148. A. DowNS, supra note 121, at 104; A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS 18-21 (2d ed. 1974).
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a group, government bureaucrats vote more than any other group.'49
And, since their interests are served by expanded services, they rationally
vote for increased spending. So long as the gain from increased salary or
perquisites is greater than the increase in taxes paid by the bureaucrat, he
will vote for larger output and staff."' The larger the bureaucracy the
more likely its political clout will be one to be reckoned with, particularly
at state and local levels where often there are residency requirements for
government employees, thus, making the link more pronounced."'
Government bureaus, more often than not, enjoy a monopoly position in
bargaining for spending appropriations. It is the unit that has contacts
with the outside constituents and that, based on its information from
these constituents and its own perceptions of the unit's goals and policies,
prepares a budget agenda for the legislators who "purchase" the goods to
be produced. If the unit in question faces some competition from either
the private sector or other bureaucratic units within the government that
provide similar services, there will be other sources of information as to
needs and costs, which should result in more effective monitoring of bu-
reau expenditures. 152
Even so, the magnitude of the information that would be needed to
carry out a complete evaluation of a budget proposal makes the legisla-
ture vulnerable to the monopoly of the bureaucracy over information.
Rather than make a complete evaluation, the legislature's budgetary pro-
cess is a once a year review in which the reviewers/purchasers are
presented with, and vote on, a total budget output at a particular level of
expenditure.1 5 3 As Aaron Wildavsky states, the budgetary process is "in-
cremental" in that it builds on the last budget and reflects previous nego-
tiations and agreements, which, absent changed circumstances known to
the reviewer, are not reevaluated.' 5 4 The focus is on detectable shifts in
149. Bush & Denzau supra note 144, at 90-98.
150. Id. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
151. Downs argues that when "a newly elected (or relected) government sets up its planned
expenditure, it asks whether each expenditure 'Is . . . worth its cost in votes in terms of votes
gained?'." If that is true, then the more certain loss of votes from bureaucrats (and their families)
when spending is to be reduced is a significant factor. A. DOWNS, supra note 139, at 69.
Bush and Denzau suggest that earlier legislation that prohibited bureaucrats from voting in the
political units where they worked was designed to counteract their predilection to vote for expanded
budgets. Bush & Denzau, supra note 144, at 90-98.
152. W. NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 40; Inman, The Fiscal Performance of Local Govern-
ments: An Interpretive Review, in CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 270, 300 (1979); Nis-
kanen, supra note 139, at 636-39.
153. W. NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 151.
154. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 148, at 13, 15-16; A. DowNs, supra note 121, at 247-51.
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the budget from the last one and on any new programs sought to be
included in the new budget.55 This is in contrast to the way in which a
firm makes budgetary decisions. The budget for much of its operations is
determined by the level of market demand for the firm's products and,
thus, the costs and benefits are continuously reevaluated.
From the investor's perspective, the behavior of bureaucrats, which
results in non-disclosure of information, is of consequence if the result of
such behavior skews the true picture of future expenditures. If the as-
sumptions as to program costs and time are inaccurate, future expendi-
tures may be understated and revenues overstated, either of which will
effect the investor's credit analysis of the issuer.
2. Controls. The preceding Section described the incentives to
which politicians and bureaucrats respond in order to determine whether
one can expect them to gather, process, and disseminate information in a
way that promotes both expenditure decisions that represent an efficient
allocation of resources and timely adjustments in the level of spending to
respond to changes in the economic climate.
Theories of organizational behavior recognize that the individual
members of an organization have needs and desires independent of those
of the organization. 56 Rational behavior, in terms of the organization's
goals, may be perceived by individual members as involving costs that
are too great or rewards that are too little, and this fact influences the
way these individuals process information. Much of the work in both the
area of public administration and business management is aimed at devis-
ing systems of controls that monitor the behavior of agents in order to
correct these inherent biases. As we have seen, the application of agency
theory to shareholder management relations suggests that management
can be expected to impose on itself sufficient monitoring devices and that
mandated corporate disclosure is therefore unnecessary. Do similar mon-
itoring devices exist to counter the information problems that would
otherwise exist given the motivations of political leaders and bureaucrats
reviewed in the preceding Section? To answer this question, we need to
look at each of the potential monitors-legislators, citizens, interests
groups, investors, and underwriters-and the devices available to them.
155. A. DowNs, supra note 121, at 247-51.
156. See, eg., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVORIAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); H.
LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1960); H. SIMON, MODELS
OF MAN (1957); 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL
OBJECTIVE IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964).
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a. Legislators. One potential monitor of the behavior of govern-
ment agents is the legislature in that it is, in a sense, the direct purchaser
of government services. To perform this oversight function effectively,
legislators must overcome the bureaucracy's monopoly on information.
Alternative sources of information that legislators could tap would in-
clude hearings, audits, evaluative reports, and independently commis-
sioned research. It must be asked, however, to what extent legislators will
incur the costs of obtaining information from these other sources.
An inevitable problem in relying on the legislature as a monitor
stems from the wide range of programs provided by government. Be-
cause of this diversity, legislatures need to specialize in performing their
monitoring role. Specialization not only makes effective overall budget-
ary control mechanisms more difficult, it is also likely to make the legis-
lative monitors of the individual bureaucratic units less reliable.
Committee assignments are generally based on the requests of legislators.
These requests will reflect what are perceived to be the interests of the
legislators' constituencies.'1 7 The individual review committees thus have
a higher demand for services than would committees with randomly se-
lected members, which would be more likely to represent the median
voter.15 8 Identification of the legislative committees with the goals of the
bureaucratic units they are supposedly monitoring suggests that they are
not likely to ask hard questions about unit proposals or seek alternative
information, assuming their constituents are satisfied. Specialized com-
mittees are more likely, therefore, to support output budget maximizers,
although not fiscal residuum maximizing. 159 William Niskanen suggests
that the monitoring activities of legislators are not viewed as providing
significant rewards for individual legislators in that all taxpayers, not just
the legislator's constituents, are benefitted. As a result, monitoring activi-
ties will be undersupplied. 6 0
157. See Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Poli-
cymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). Professors Weingast and
Moran note that the committee system in Congress works to the advantage of each member in that
"he gains greater leverage over precisely those issues relevant for his own political support and hence
reelection." Id. at 771.
158. W. NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 148-51.
159. Niskanen, supra note 139, at 625-29.
160. Id. Professors Weingast and Moran have suggested, contrary to the more traditional view
of legislative control of the bureaucracy, that the absence of active monitoring by Congress does not
mean that Congress has no control over bureaucratic agencies. Under the "legislative choice" model,
agencies tailor policies to the preferences of their oversight committees in order to avoid imposition
of congressional sanctions, and, therefore, more active and costly monitoring by the committees is
not required. Weingast & Moran, supra note 157, at 777.
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Employment of typical legislative monitoring devices requires addi-
tional staff, as well as a commitment of additional time by the individual
legislators. At the federal level, oversight activities have led to the crea-
tion of a parallel bureaucracy of staff aides in Congress to monitor the
activities of the bureaucracy of the executive branch. 161 At the state and
local levels, where legislators are often part-time and without access to
funds to employ hired staff, it is not likely that they will affirmatively
procure costly information.16 2 Similarly, with high turn over rates at the
state and local levels, legislators are less likely to engage in monitoring
activities. 163 As one commentator notes, at the local level, the legislatures
are "weak vetoing agents" due to the information imbalance and do not
play any major role in the budgetary process.16
The foregoing discussion concerned the functioning of states and
their general local governments. When we turn to the monitoring of pub-
lic authorities by the legislatures that created such entities, we find that
monitoring is all but non-existent. As Ann Marie H. Walsh stated in her
study of the institution of public authorities, they are the ultimate in "bu-
reau power," satellites spun out to operate without much in the way of
restraints. 165 The defaults of the New York State Urban Development
Corporation ("UDC") in 1974 on $100 million in notes and the WPPSS
default suggest that these authorities operated without legislative moni-
toring until they ran into financial difficulties. The Moreland Commis-
sion investigating the UDC default found that "the principal institutional
weaknesses in the authority device are the lack of accountability to or
adequate monitoring by the Legislature, Comptroller, Executive and
Public, and lack of overall state planning and debt management." 166 The
Commission's recommendation was to create an independent agency to
monitor the financing decisions of the state's authorities. 167 The Wash-
ington State legislature did not look critically at WPPSS's activities until
161. Rosenbloom, supra note 135, at 105. This phenomenon represents what Downs called the
law of duplication: "Any attempt to control one large organization tends to generate another." A.
DOWNS, supra note 121, at 262.
162. Professor Walsh makes this point in connection with the lack of legislative oversight of
public authorities. A. WALSiH, supra note 46, at 298-99.
163. Gray, Accountability in Policy Process: An Alternative Perspective, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN
URBAN SOCIETY, supra note 135, at 176.
164. JInman, supra note 152, at 300.
165. A. WALSH, supra note 46, at 253.
166. N.Y. STATE MORELAND ACT COMM'N ON THE URB. DEV. CORP. & OTHER STATE FI-
NANCING AGENCIES, RESTORING CREDIT & CONFIDENCE 20 (1976).
167. Id.
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1980, amidst wide-ranging allegations of cost overruns.168 An independ-
ent review of the feasibility of Plants 4 and 5, conducted in 1981 at the
request of the state legislature, recommended, among other things, more
legislative oversight. 16
9
b. Citizens. Citizens are the ultimate determinant of what public
services are produced and consumed. They make their preferences
known through voting. Between elections, citizens can communicate
their wants either individually or through group activity to their repre-
sentatives. The average voter, however, has little motivation to become
informed due to the high costs of gathering information as compared
with perceived gain. 7 ' Each voter perceives that the expected return is
low on the investment of time and energy necessary to become well in-
formed because it is unlikely that his vote, whether intelligent or unin-
formed, will affect the outcome of the election. Thus, each is unlikely to
invest the time necessary to gather the information. However, if a suffi-
cient portion of the electorate undertook the investment, the gains to
each of them might well exceed the costs in terms of more favorable
policy-making decisions by officials thus elected. But, in fact, a sufficient
portion will not undertake such a task because each individual voter has
an incentive to avoid the investment and "free ride" on the efforts of
others.
While the same kind of problem to some extent besets reliance on
shareholder votes as a control device for corporate managers, it is not as
serious. 17 1 The individual shareholder with a few shares of stock has the
same incentives to be a "free rider" as the individual citizen voter. But
168. Gleckman, supra note 34, at 27.
169. UNIVERSITY OF WASH. ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF WNP-4
AND WNP-5: FINAL REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE 30 (Mar. 15, 1982).
170. This theory of the role of information in the voting decision-making process is based on the
work of Anthony Downs. See A. DOWNS, supra note 139. Downs argues that even if one were to
assume each vote would determine the elections, no one has much incentive to acquire information
because:
(1) information is relatively useless to those citizens who care which party wins [it is
unlikely that any information would change their minds] and (2) those for whom infor-
mation is most useful do not care who wins .... [I]t seems probable that for a great many
citizens in a democracy, rational behavior excludes any investment whatever in political
information per se.
Id. at 244-45. See also J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 139 (economic analysis of decision-
making process of voting).
171. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
Easterbrook and Fischel present a recent analysis of corporate democracy, in which voting is seen as
filling in the details of the contracts between shareholders and management that form the basis of the
corporation. Id. at 402.
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there are differences between corporate democracy and political democ-
racy that make it more likely that a sufficient number of corporate share-
holders will seek out information and act as an effective control
mechanism. Since shares are bought and sold in the market, there will be
some shareholders who will seek information for trading purposes. The
fact that each share of stock is entitled to one vote, moreover, allows any
given shareholder to aggregate votes. Thus, a shareholder seeking to take
control of a firm through tender offer has incentives to ferret out infor-
mation whether or not voluntarily disclosed. 172 Similarly, in recent years,
some institutional investors that held major shares of an issuer and had
incentives to be well informed, have used their votes on occasion to affect
corporate policy. The citizen has only one vote which cannot be traded
except by moving from one community to another. 173
In addition to the analogy between citizens and shareholders as
checks on managerial discretion, there is an analogy between citizens and
consumers. Consumers of the products of a firm are likely to more effec-
tively influence management decision making than the consumers of gov-
ernment services. A process of natural selection is at work in the private
sector. In a competitive economy, a firm whose management persists in a
pattern of behavior whereby, at the margin, the cost of the firm's product
exceeds its value in the eyes of the public, is likely to be driven out of
business. The price the firm receives for its product will be below its
costs, reflecting the availability of the product from lower cost competi-
tors or the availability of other products preferred by the public. By con-
trast, citizens as consumers of government services cannot register their
complaints as quickly when that which the government produces costs
more than it should, or when more services are being produced than citi-
zens want, given what they have to pay for their costs. Their remedies are
limited to political opposition to the incumbents or moving from the
community. "Exiting" from the community may require the forfeiture of
172. Id. at 402, 406. See also Spann, Public Versus Private Provision ofGovernmental Services, in
BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS, supra note 135, at 71-72 (discussing differences between sharehold-
ers in private firms and "shareholders" in governments).
173. Buchanan and Tullock advance the theory that log-rolling is in fact a form of vote-trading,
used to take into account unequal intensity in preferences among voters and thus is a means of
protecting minority interests. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 139, at 134-35, 270-81,
Nevertheless, these are trades within the organization that neither increase the amount of informa-
tion available nor provide an exit mechanism for those dissatisfied with the current level of services.
Voting, moreover, as a means of voicing opposition, occurs only at set times. Between elections,
citizens must accept the level of output provided. Spann, supra note 172, at 71, 73. See generally A.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) (comparative analysis of roles of exit and voice in
economic and political arenas).
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significant property rights and is not likely to be exercised except in ex-
treme situations.
174
The insensitivity of the political system to the value the public puts
on government services sets the stage for fiscal crises unless the munici-
pal securities market is well informed and can facilitate needed adjust-
ments. The level of the politically acceptable tax rate, in the long run,
reflects, in part, the value the public puts on the services it receives. But
when borrowing is easy, and public appreciation for services is hard to
measure, a government that is producing services that cost more than
their value can operate for an extended period of time without having to
face this reality.
175
c. Interest Groups. Interest groups operate as a control mechanism
in at least two ways. First, they are instrumental in providing politicians,
during the inter-election period, with information as to voters' prefer-
ences for specific policies and the intensity of those preferences. Thus,
they help shape government policies. 176 Second, they clearly perform a
monitoring function since, unlike the average voter, they have incentives
to become informed and to inform other voters in an effort to influence
government policies. They "push public agencies toward accountability
174. De Alessi, supra note 142, at 13, 17.
175. Spann theorizes that competition should curtail discretionary behavior of bureaucrats and
lead to higher quality goods. Spann, supra note 172, at 71. While Spann cites studies showing that
private firms can produce some public goods more efficiently than can public entities, he provides no
data as to the benefits of competition between private and public firms in terms of government
output. Id. In another article, Spann notes that the public sector had lower rates of productivity than
the private sector even in areas where it faced competition from private goods. Spann, Rates of
Productivity Change and the Growth of State and Local Governmental Expenditures, in BUDGETS
AND BUREAUCRATS, supra note 135, at 100, 127.
Professor Hirschman suggests that private competition may, in fact, result in less, not more,
efficient production by government. A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173. According to Hirschman's
theory, the existence of an exit mechanism that permits the citizen, as consumer, to switch to higher
quality private services, lessens the effect of the voice mechanism by removing those persons most
likely to use political processes for redress. Id. at 45-53. At the same time, the fact that most govern-
ment services are funded, at least in part, by general tax revenues deadens the effect of the exit
mechanism. Id. at 59. For the "lazy monopolist," as Hirschman refers to bureaucrats in such situa-
tions, competition in effect rids the system of those who might bring to the attention of legislators
and top officials instances of management slack. Id. at 59-60.
176. Majority vote elections indicate a consensus as to the majority's first choice among candi-
dates, which may tell us what issues are important, but not necessarily what polices are preferred.
For the politicians, the task is to discern in the inter-election period what the voters want as to
specific policies. See 3. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 139 at 283-95; R. DAHL, A PREF-
ACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 127-30 (1956); A. DowNs, supra note 139, at 90-93; K. SCHLOZMAN
& J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 165, 276 (1986).
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by forcing communication." 177 Yet, this monitoring device has limita-
tions in that the scope of each group's activity is dependent upon the
particular expectations and goals of the group, which may or may not be
consistent with what the majority of voters want.17 8 In fact, economic
interest groups (as opposed to public interest groups)17 9 are likely to sup-
port expanded benefits, and therefore higher spending, than the general
public would support if informed.180
d. Investors. Although the average citizen may have little or no
economic incentive for gathering information concerning governmental
managers, this is not necessarily true of investors in municipal securities.
Active participants in the municipal securities market will seek informa-
tion about alternative investments in order to assess the risks of default
attached to each investment. In gathering that information, they may be
advised by professional investment advisors.18 1 However, financial so-
177. Baer, Interest Groups and Accountability: An Incompatible Pair, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN
URBAN SOCIETY, supra note 135, at 218.
178. The role of interest groups in American politics can be viewed as providing a "minoritarian
tendency to counter balance the more majoritarian proclivities of other parts of the political pro-
cess," in that they articulate "demands by the narrowly interested and well-organized." K.
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 176, at 400.
179. Despite the growth of public interest groups in the last 25 years, a recent examination of
the make-up of organized interests, at the federal level, reveals that business groups continue to
dominate and, in fact, increased their presence from 57% in 1960, to 72% in 1980. Id. at 77-78.
180. Some observers of interest group behavior criticize the effect of these groups on economic
performance because they obtain benefits for a narrow group while the costs are spread throughout
the community. See, eg., M. OLSEN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47 (1982). Olsen
argues that narrow interest groups operate to gain "larger shares or slices of the social pie" for their
members, reducing social output rather than striving to make the social pie larger by eliminating
social losses. The latter- goal results in benefits spread out for everyone in society. The goals of
interest groups will emphasize the short-run benefits and ignore or discount the long-term conse-
quences to the public as a whole. Id. at 42. See also K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 176,
at 406-10 (discussing criticisms of current level of interest group activity in political process today).
181. In the last five years there has been a significant increase in the number of municipal secur-
ity analysts. Prior to that time, municipal research analysts were few in number. A 1975 survey
showed that of the 87 major institutional investors and underwriters of municipal securities, 54
employed no analysts and the remaining 33 employed a total of 64 full time analysts. 1976 Hearings,
supra note 13, at 253 (testimony of Professor Forbes). The SEC investigation into New York City's
securities yielded similar findings. Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Chemical Bank, and Merrill
Lynch, four of the six managing underwriters for the City's notes, had a combined total of nine
employees who did municipal research. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 7, at 7-8 (analyzing question-
naires sent to managing underwriters). Today, the National Federation of Municipal Analysts (or-
ganized in 1983 and composed of six regional constituent societies) has approximately 500 members.
Telephone conversation with Jeffrey Noss, chairman of the National Federation of Municipal Ana-
lysts and an analyst with Roosevelt and Cross (Sept. 5, 1986). Conversations with analysts and
observers of the market suggest that this growth responds to the increase in the size of the municipal
market during this period, the increased use of more complicated forms of financing, including vari-
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phistication is of little value if issuers do not release information only
they possess. If adequate information with which to make their assess-
ments is not available, investors will require higher interest rates to com-
pensate for the unknown risk. Evidence of this behavior is found in
studies of bond yield premiums in the secondary municipal securities
market that find an inverse relationship between yields and the intensive-
ness of accounting practices."8 2 Similarly, studies show a direct relation-
ship between municipal ratings and intensiveness of accounting
practices.18 3 However, the fact that investors have some incentive to
gather information and act on it will affect the behavior of governmental
managers and their resource allocation decisions only if these managers
are sensitive to the sanctions that investors wield for issuers that do not
provide adequate information. We have seen that, unlike corporate man-
agers, who have a variety of reasons to want to avoid lower share prices
and higher financing costs, government managers, in fact, are less in-
clined to respond to the consequences of poor disclosure.18 4
e. Underwriters. Underwriters play a key role in the process of in-
formation disclosure in the original issuance of corporate securities. This
function would be likely to continue in the same form even if the federal
system of mandatory disclosure was abandoned. Like accountants, un-
derwriters act as verifiers of the information disclosed by the issuer.185
They combine knowledge of the general conditions of the capital markets
with a direct, and often ongoing, relationship with the issuer, giving them
specific information as to the issuer's affairs. As financial intermediaries,
whose own success is dependent upon investors continuing to accept
their advice as to investment decisions, underwriters can damage them-
ous credit enforcement devices, such as insurance and letters of credit arrangements, and the in-
creased level of trading and money-management. Telephone interview with Perry Young, Vice
President, Standard & Poor's (May 15, 1986); telephone interview with Jeffrey Noss, supra. For
example, long-term bond issues in 1985 increased 60% from 1984. THE BOND BUYER, May 8, 1986,
at 24. At least one commentator, Professor Ronald Forbes, Director of the Municipal Finance Study
Group, State University of New York at Albany, does not believe that the increase in the number of
analysts has resulted in any significant increase in available information. It is his opinion that the
ratings continue to be the most important source of information in the market. Telephone interview
with Professor Ronald Forbes (Aug. 4, 1986).
182. Ingram & Copeland, Municipal Market Measures and Reporting Practices: An Extension,
20 J. AcCT. REs. 766 (1982).
183. Copeland & Ingram, The Association Between Municipal Market Measures and Selected
Financial Reporting Practices, 20 J. AcCT. REs. 275 (1982).
184. See supra Section IV(A) & (B)(1).
185. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 111, at 618-21; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 94, at
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selves seriously if they convey inaccurate information. Thus, underwrit-
ers will take pains to verify the information they pass on to investors. 186
Underwriters are much less likely to play this role with municipal
securities because, unlike corporate securities, a substantial part of the
market is conducted on a competitively bid, rather than negotiated, basis.
The details of the competitive bidding process are intricate and have been
well described elsewhere. However, certain aspects of the process are im-
portant for our discussion of the production of information.1, 7 First, un-
like negotiated issues, where financial advice regarding what to market
and when is performed by the same entity that puts together the under-
writing syndicate, in most competitively bid transactions, these functions
are performed by separate entities in order to preserve the integrity of the
bidding process. For a major issue that is to be competitively bid, the
process of bringing that issue to market will typically involve the utiliza-
tion of an investment bank or consulting firm as financial advisor before
the issue is put out to bid. This process is followed by the selection-
through bidding-of a syndicate group to underwrite the issue to the
public. The official statements do not typically refer to the financial advi-
sor or underwriter by name.188 Thus, neither firm's reputation is immedi-
ately at stake.
A second significant factor is the time span involved in an issue to be
competitively bid. Bids are solicited by published notices of sale and are
generally required within a week of the publication date. The underwrit-
ers do not have an opportunity to examine in detail the financial struc-
ture of the issuer and the feasibility of the proposed project, or to
participate in the preparation of the official statement. There is no "due
diligence" investigation as to the accuracy of projected revenues and ex-
penditures, time schedules for proposed projects, and similar concerns. A
miscalculation as to the marketability of the issue, or a failure to cor-
rectly predict the direction of interest rates, can leave the syndicate mem-
bers with bonds they cannot sell, except at a loss, or unexpected profits.
While investment bankers make similar decisions every day in terms of
pricing corporate securities, that portion of their analysis that is a calcu-
186. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 111, at 618-21; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 94, at
688.
187. See, eg., A. RABINOWITZ, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION (1969);
Kidwell & Sorensen, Investment Banking and Underwriting of New Municipal Issues, in 1 THE MU-
NICIPAL BOND HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 169.
188. The notice of sale often will contain the name of the financial advisor as the source for
further information in connection with the proposed offering.
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lation of the particular credit risk involved in a competitively bid issue is
made in a relatively short time period with limited information.
By definition, not every bid is the winning bid in a competitive bid-
ding system. Costs incurred in gathering information about an issuer in
order to make a bid may not be recouped. This means that information
gathering is kept to a minimum, not only to limit losses, but also to give
firms the time to bid on more issues and increase the opportunities to
win.
In negotiated underwritings, underwriters and their counsel can per-
form the same verifying functions they perform with respect to corporate
securities. Although underwriters can be sued under the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws in connection with the issuance of municipal
securities, they have no "due diligence" obligation under the 1933 Act
with respect to municipal securities underwritten by them. In the absence
of an affirmative obligation to seek disclosure (except to avoid material
misrepresentations) and of a tradition on the part of underwriters to pro-
cure information due to the dominance of competitive bidding in the
past, it would seem unlikely, as a general matter, that their efforts at
verification differ significantly. Empirical evidence in this area is scant;
but the findings of two very recent studies of disclosure practices of mu-
nicipal issuers in connection with general obligation bond issues and rev-
enue bond issues suggest that negotiated underwritings do not result in
any greater degree of disclosure. 18 9 Both studies surveyed official state-
ments of municipal issuers to determine compliance with the voluntary
disclosure guidelines of the Government Finance Officers Association.
The revenue bond issues surveyed, like the revenue bond market as a
whole, were negotiated issues, while the general obligation issues were
competitively bid. Overall, the revenue bond survey did not find any
greater compliance with the guidelines than that found in the general
obligation bond survey. And, as will be explored in more detail in the
next Section, both revealed significant shortcomings.
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING MUNICIPAL DISCLOSURE
The empirical record tends to confirm the theoretical conclusion
reached here that municipal issuers will not voluntarily provide investors
with the optimal amount of information. While there is no absolute
189. Forbes & McGrath, Disclosure Practices on Tax-Exempt General Obligation Bonds: An
Update, 7 MUN. FIN. J. 207 (1986); Forbes, Disclosure Practices on Revenue Bonds Issued by State
and Local Governments: A Survey (May 23, 1986) (prepared at State University of New York at
Albany).
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benchmark as to what this optimal amount is, the evidence does reveal a
striking contrast between the disclosure practices of municipal issuers
and those of corporate issuers. These differences cannot be easily ex-
plained in terms of differences in the needs of investors in the two mar-
kets or in the nature of the credit risks involved because the two markets
have become increasingly similar.
One marked difference between the municipal securities market and
the corporate securities market is the absence of consistent, uniform use
of audited financial statements by municipal issuers. A survey of munici-
pal issuers in 1975 found only 10% of the surveyed issuers supplied au-
dited financial reports. 190 A 1985 survey of general obligation bond issues
shows the percentage today is around 54%.191 A similar survey of reve-
nue bond issues found that, overall, 61.3% of those surveyed included
audited statements. Surprisingly, issuers of over $10 million (approxi-
mately 40% of the sample and 50% of the revenue bond market) in-
cluded audited financial statements less frequently than issuers in the
median range of $5-10 million (approximately 18% of the sample and
20% of the revenue bond market), which had the highest percentage of
audited statements (72% as compared with 67%).192 A third study of
disclosure practices with respect to bond issues that have credit enhance-
ments, that is, issues backed by insurance or letters of credit of financial
institutions, has also been recently concluded. It found little uniformity
in disclosure practices. Specifically, the authors noted that there was
"generally an absence of substantive financial information (e.g. audited
financial statements) from the supplier of the credit enhancement," and
"little information disclosed on the legal standing of the 'enhancement' in
the event of an insolvency of the supplier."' 93
A 1983 study of municipal financial reporting practices found wide-
spread non-compliance with generally accepted accounting principles at
the local government level.194 It also found that reporting of lease obliga-
190. 1976 Hearings, supra note 13, at 252.
191. Forbes & McGrath, supra note 189, at 211.
192. Forbes, supra note 189, at 13-14.
193. Disclosure Practices on Tax-Exempt Bond Issues: The Case of Credit Enhancements 2
(Nov. 15, 1985) (a report by the Financial Markets Research Center, School of Business, SUNY,
Albany).
194. Seligman cites an Arthur Young and Company study of 557 cities and counties in which
over one-fourth of all auditied statements contained inadequate accounting practices or use of an
"inappropriate basis of valuation of fixed assets." Fifty-four percent of the opinions by the auditors
were qualified. J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 285 (1984).
There has been, since 1934, an accounting organization to establish state and local government
accounting principles. This organization was the National Council on Government Accounting until
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tions, pension fund liabilities, and property tax revenues, which were ma-
jor problem areas with New York City's financial statements, continue to
be areas where there is little meaningful disclosure.195 A 1985 study of
general obligation bond issues yielded findings of inadequacies in the re-
porting of pension fund liabilities, property tax collection, and outstand-
ing indebtedness in prior years. 196 Another area of non-disclosure
revealed by the general obligation bond study was the inadequate report-
ing of short-term debt. Previous experience with municipal defaults, both
large and small, suggests that misuse of short-term debt is often a signifi-
cant contributing factor.197 The revenue bond study found inadequacies
in providing detailed operating statements for at least one prior year and
in providing current balance sheets, as well as reporting of short-term
debt, schedules of current debt, and statements of prior years' debt. In-
formation as to principal customers, capacity, and utilization of the en-
terprise was found to be "less likely to be discussed." Similarly, "only
slightly more than 26% of the sample provided detailed summaries of the
reports by engineers or financial consultants." 1 98 These areas of non-dis-
closure are of critical importance in evaluating the probabilities of suc-
cess of the projects to be financed.
Another indication of the disclosure problems in the municipal mar-
ket is the much larger role played by the bond rating agencies compared
to their role in the corporate market and the questions concerning the
quality of their evaluations. Most observers agree that ratings are the
single most important method by which participants in the municipal
securities market become informed about the credit risks associated with
the issues being offered.' 99 Empirical evidence supporting this proposi-
tion demonstrates that a change in a rating results in an immediate
change in the affected issuer's borrowing costs, bringing them "in har-
mony with the costs of other communities in their new rating classes."'2"o
The New York City and WPPSS defaults are not reassuring as to
1984, when it was replaced by the Government Accounting Standards Board, modeled after the
Financial Accounting Standards Board in the private sector. The hope is that this latest attempt to
create standards for government accounting will meet with greater compliance.
195. Id. at 285-86.
196. Forbes & McGrath, supra note 189, at 213-16.
197. Id. at 214-16.
198. Forbes, supra note 189, at 7, 9, 10, 12.
199. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 2; see also R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 25, at 51-
52 (ratings have "grown from next to negligible importance into a central and, in many cases, con-
trolling factor in whether an investor or institution will buy a municipal bond.").
200. G. JANTSCHER, THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN CREDIT RATINGS ON MUNICIPAL BOR-
ROWING COSTS 19 (1970).
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the quality of these ratings. New York City carried an "A" rating even
after the markets had closed.2"' WPPSS Plants 4 and 5 Bonds carried an
"A/A plus" rating until June, 1981, when the Managing Director of
WPPSS called for a moratorium on construction. In response, WPPSS's
ratings were downgraded to "Baa/A," which are still investment grade
ratings, but which (as to the "Baa" rating) have speculative characteris-
tics. 2 While this may be regarded as anecdotal evidence of the accuracy
of ratings, the magnitude of the anecdotes in the whole municipal credit
scene suggests that they should be taken seriously.
There is also statistical evidence of problems with ratings. A study
of both upgraded and downgraded cities found that such cities could be
"classified with a high degree of accuracy on the basis of fiscal variables
alone, even up to three years prior to the actual rating change. '20 3 While
there is also evidence that the market anticipates, to a significant extent,
ratings changes, suggesting that other sources of information are impor-
tant, the fact that the actual rating change brings a further reaction sug-
gests that there is a segment of the market that relies on the ratings as
"independent signals." 2"
Commentators suggest several reasons for the problems associated
with the quality of the ratings. Some suggest that rating agencies respond
to political pressure not to downgrade ratings.20 5 Others blame the lag on
understaffing of the agencies.20 6 Rating agencies do not conduct anything
comparable to the due diligence undertaken by underwriters in a corpo-
rate securities issue. With approximately 5,000 new issues to be rated
each year by staffs of around 80,207 less attention is necessarily given to
seeking further information than that which is supplied by the issuers.
In the aftermath of New York City's near default, arguments for
regulation were met with counter arguments that the market was forcing
issuers to disclose. Much of the empirical evidence cited above suggests
that there has been an improvement since 1975, but it also suggests that
large differences between municipal and corporate market disclosure re-
201. SEC REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 28.
202. Gleckman, supra note 34, at 34.
203. Raman, FinancialReporting and Municipal Bond Rating Changes, 56 AcCT. REV. 910, 918
(1981).
204. Id. at 911.
205. Id. at 922; The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
206. J. PETERSEN, supra note 30, at 91.
207. Both Standard & Poor's and Moody's have increased their staffs significantly in the last 10
years from approximately 15 to 80. This increase was attributed primarily to the growth in the
number of issues and the complexity of issues. Telephone interviews with Perry Young, supra note
181, and with Michael Beauchamp, Moody's Investors Service (May 16, 1986).
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main. Comparisons of the information voluntarily supplied by WPPSS
with the facts as revealed by preliminary investigations indicate how sig-
nificant the municipal disclosure problems continue to be. For example,
there appears to have been less than full disclosure as to the budgets used
in the offering statements. The body of the official statement gives no
indication of the percentage increase in construction cost estimates over
time. The estimates as to electricity consumption also appear to have
been unsound. An extensive article on the WPPSS default reported that
internal budget estimates existed that were far higher than those used in
the offering statements.2 °0 A 1979 paper examining the WPPSS offering
statements found similar discrepancies in the figures used.20 9 For exam-
ple, the March 1, 1979, offering statement for Plant 2 stated that power
costs from that unit were estimated at 28.5 mills/kwh, while a March 2,
1979, letter from the managing director estimated costs at 32.7 mills/
kwh.210 The offering statements continued to use projected power re-
quirements that were based on assumptions of higher growth for the re-
gion than other available studies and on the assumption of critical water
shortages that, in the Northwest, with abundant water resources, were
unlikely to occur frequently.211 The figures as to projected energy de-
mand also failed to account for conservation as utility rates increased.212
Also, there was a failure to disclose legal questions as to the enforceabil-
ity of the participation agreements that formed. the basis of guarantees of
payment under the take-or-pay contracts. Finally, no mention is made of
the public district utilities about whom bond counsel did not opine be-
cause of doubts regarding the enforceability of their participation
agreements.21 3
These were all critical matters. It was the cost overruns, coupled
with growing recognition that the two units would not be needed for at
least ten to fifteen years, that eventually led to the termination of Plants 4
and 5. The unenforceability of the participation agreements ultimately
led to the default.
The overall impression given by the WPPSS official statement is that
208. Gleckman, supra note 34, at 16, 27.
209. J. Lazar, The Official Bond Statements of The Washington Public Power Suppy System: A
Critique, reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Mining, Forest Management, and Bonne-
ville Power Administration of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at
234 (1984).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 240-41.
212. Gleckman, supra note 34, at 10.
213. Id. at 18.
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the issuer did not feel pressure to take the disclosure process seriously.
One indication of this casual attitude is the repetition of information
from one offering statement to the next even when the information be-
came dated. Interestingly, all but one of the fifteen offerings for the de-
faulted Plants 4 and 5 were competitively bid. Had there been a
registration process with affirmative due diligence on the part of issuers,
underwriters, and their respective lawyers, some of the areas of non-dis-
closure and misinformation in both the New York City and WPPSS situ-
ations would probably have been brought to light in the process of
drafting a disclosure document that would have been subject to review by
others familiar with the disclosure requirements.2"4
VI. CONCLUSION
The municipal securities market relies on voluntary disclosure of in-
formation. It has been traditionally assumed that since the only investors
attracted to municipal bonds are those who are either financially sophis-
ticated themselves (for example, banks and casualty insurance compa-
nies) or wealthy individuals capable of buying financial advice and
withstanding losses, these investors would be able to procure adequate
amounts of information for themselves. Underlying this basic assumption
is a second assumption that, given the low default record for municipal
bonds, less information is needed. Neither assumption is true in today's
municipal securities market. The profile of the investor in municipal se-
curities is not much different than the investor in the corporate securities
market, making the need for information just as great. The market does,
in fact, differentiate among issuers in its pricing of securities based on its
assessment of credit risk. Therefore, information is needed to make these
distinctions accurately.
Accurate market determinations of municipal credit risk serve vital
social functions. The communities represented by state and local govern-
ments need good fiscal management: sensible tradeoffs reflecting commu-
nity preferences between amounts of services and facilities provided in
the present and in the future, and paying for them in the present or the
future. Citizen and legislative monitoring of governmental fiscal manage-
ment has inherent limitations. Unless the market makes accurate credit
determinations, serious misallocations of resources are likely to occur,
214. For a description of the disclosure benefits derived from the process of due diligence exer-
cised in connection with drafting a corporate registration statement for a public offering, see Fox,
supra note 101, at 1025-26 & n.61.
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and timely adjustments in the level of public expenditures may not be
made.
There are good reasons to believe that municipal issuers will not
voluntarily disclose all the information that the market needs to perform
this pricing and credit risk analysis function. The analysis of the motiva-
tions of government managers suggests that they may withhold informa-
tion, good and bad, even though this behavior results in higher
borrowing costs. Less costly financing does not translate into rewards
that government managers can take personal advantage of. The costs of
not disclosing, moreover, may not be felt during the current manage-
ment's term in office. For these reasons, other management objectives,
such as larger budgets and more capital improvements, may prevail even
where paying for them will at some point in the future require high tax
rates, which are politically unacceptable, or severe reductions in services
and capital spending.
Agency theory identifies a number of forces that are at work to elicit
information concerning the behavior of corporate managers and to con-
trol that behavior. In contrast, none of the potential monitors of govern-
mental management are likely to be effective in terms of either directly
enforcing good fiscal management or in obtaining information that the
market can use to do the job. The legislators on the specialized commit-
tees responsible for individual bureaucratic units have interests at vari-
ance with the general public interest. Both individual legislators
reviewing the overall budget process and individual citizens as voters
have insufficient incentives to become informed. Citizens cannot easily
control governmental behavior by switching to another supplier of public
services. Interest groups have incentives to both become informed and to
inform others regarding policies they wish to promote. But they might
not be concerned with good fiscal management in general, or as it relates
to particular programs, if that goal results in less economic benefit for
their members. Investors lack the leverage to obtain more information
because of the insensitivity of government managers to the effects of in-
sufficient disclosure on their borrowing costs. Underwriters in competi-
tively bid issues do not have the time to undertake the kind of due
diligence investigation traditionally performed by them in negotiated cor-
porate issues.
This analysis demonstrates that there is too little information avail-
able in the municipal securities market. It is both a problem of non-dis-
closure of information relevant to investment decisions and a problem of
lack of uniformity with respect to what is disclosed, making comparison
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of investment risks difficult. Some form of mandatory disclosure rules are
therefore needed.215
Two types of federal regulation were suggested in the aftermath of
the New York City fiscal crisis: Senate Bill No. 2574 (the Eagleton bill)
and Senate Bill No. 2969 (the Williams-Tower bill). The Eagleton bill's
reform was simple: remove the exemption in Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933
Act for municipal securities, thereby placing municipal issuers under the
same disclosure scheme as applicable to corporate issuers. This sugges-
tion received little or no support. A number of arguments were mar-
shalled against it. It was criticized for failing to recognize differences in
structure between the two markets; it would over-load the SEC, which
had no experience with municipal securities; it was an allegedly unconsti-
tutional intrusion into matters of state sovereignty; and it was too
costly.216
The Williams-Tower bill took a more limited approach. It provided
for a disclosure statement to be prepared in connection with issues of
over five million dollars in securities, and annual reports by issuers with
outstanding securities in excess of fifty million dollars. The bill specified
in each case the information to be required and gave the SEC the author-
ity to require other "similar and specific information," and to prescribe
forms and accounting methods. Unlike the regime for corporate issuers,
however, the bill did not give the SEC any pre-filing review authority.2
17
The hearings and the commentary on the Williams-Tower bill re-
vealed a number of concerns. Three were recurrent: the exemption for
small issuers, the exemption for issuers in states that provided for state
disclosure regulation, and questions regarding the liability of issuers,
their officials, and underwriters. The bill did not pass, perhaps because of
the climate created by the National League of Cities case,2 18 and the pre-
liminary evidence that municipal issuers were disclosing more
215. Municipal issuers and underwriters are subject to the existing antifraud provisions of both
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. See supra note 4. While the threat of potential liability under these
provisions may act to deter egregious misrepresentations by municipal issuers, the kinds of reforms
needed to serve the broad purposes of disclosure discussed in this Article require disclosure regula-
tion that creates standards for affirmative disclosure of accurate information and provides a mecha-
nism for monitoring its adequacy.
216. See, e.g., 1976 Hearings, supra note 13, at 23 (testimony of SEC Chairman Roderick M.
Hills); id. at 155-56 (testimony of Hon. Richard Carver, Mayor of Peoria, Illinois, on behalf of the
National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors); see also Note, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 1976 DUKE L. REv. 1261, 1278-79.
217. S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976, § 13A(f)(2)-(3).
218. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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information.2 9
The issues raised by these two proposals, as well as issues as to
whether continuous disclosure is necessary in the municipal securities
market, and whether other alternatives exist, such as reliance on state
regulation or the availability of insurance, should be addressed in the
context set forth in this Article. Any of these approaches to the problem
of non-disclosure would obviously involve costs. But this Article demon-
strates that the costs of ignoring the problem-higher borrowing costs
borne by the taxpayers and the costs borne by society as a whole in the
form of misallocation of resources and fiscal mismanagement in the pub-
lic sector-may well be greater.
219. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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